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From the Editors

The Doron Halpern Middle East Network Analysis Desk is happy to present the November issue of Beehive. The current issue opens with an examination of the upsurge in admiration for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, following the wave of arrests of senior officials in the kingdom. We then analyze the public discourse surrounding the events of Cyrus the Great Day in Iran. Finally, we conclude with a study of the surprising conduct of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who, in contrast to his past statements, chose to adopt a sympathetic attitude toward the founder of the Turkish Republic on the anniversary of his death.

Enjoy!
“Hand-in-hand against the traitors:” Saudi SNS support the Crown Prince and the arrest of the princes

Gilad Shiloach

The extraordinary wave of arrests in Saudi Arabia in early November, including the arrest of dozens of senior officials in the kingdom on suspicion of corruption, received widespread support from Saudi users of social networking sites (SNS). This was expressed in the demand to increase and intensify the fight against corruption in many areas of the country, along with sweeping sympathy for the leader of the struggle, the 32-year-old Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, which has approached the level of a personality cult. Despite the widespread claim among many commentators that the purpose of the arrests is to fortify the power of bin Salman, many in Saudi Arabia have chosen to adopt the narrative that it is a courageous step that will contribute to the state, especially to its younger generation.

On November 4, Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of a special Anti-Corruption Council led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.¹ In what many called a “purification campaign,”² eleven princes were arrested, including the renowned businessman Walid bin Talal, four cabinet ministers, and dozens of other senior Saudi officials, whose assets were frozen. Many assume that these arrests were intended to strengthen the power of the Crown Prince, who in any case was perceived as Saudi Arabia’s “de facto ruler” and the “living spirit” in recent years behind many moves made in the kingdom. These include the war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen that erupted in 2015, the severing of relations with Iran, the Saudi-led Gulf boycott of Qatar, and the historic social reforms that the kingdom has seen in recent months, such as the lifting of the ban on women drivers.

Just minutes after the reports of the wave of arrests emerged, Saudi Twitter users began to discuss the issue by using the hashtag “The King fights corruption” (المالك_يحارب_الفساد). This quickly topped the international list of most popular hashtags,³ and there were reports that it appeared in approximately 1.4 million tweets within a few hours.⁴ Although the wording of the hashtag attributes the struggle to the King, the posts themselves included pictures of the Crown Prince as, for example, the image at left, which includes a quote wherein bin Salman promises to fight corruption even at the cost of harming ministers and princes.⁵ In the hours and days following the wave of arrests, additional hashtags where introduced, some explicitly presenting the crown prince as the leader of the struggle: “Fans of Mohammed bin Salman” (محبي_محمد_بن_سلمان)⁶, “Mohammed bin Salman
shakes up the World” (#محمد_بن_سلمان_يبهر_العالم), “Revolution of November 4” (#ثوره_4_نوفمبر) and more.

The SNS discourse that followed the wave of arrests shows that many Saudis are convinced that the steps taken by the Crown Prince, including the arrest of other princes, are indeed intended to combat the corruption that plagues in the kingdom. The users tweeted that they wanted “Saudi Arabia without corruption”\textsuperscript{6} and that “their country would serve as a role model” for the fight against corruption\textsuperscript{7} and asked “to return the homeland’s money to its citizens.”\textsuperscript{8} Others took advantage of the opportunity to raise other problems they encounter daily: corruption in the Saudi construction industry,\textsuperscript{9} “theft of land” by businessmen,\textsuperscript{10} the low salaries of teachers,\textsuperscript{11} Saudi media companies that “deceive the citizens,”\textsuperscript{12} car prices in Saudi Arabia,\textsuperscript{13} the situation of pensioners in the kingdom,\textsuperscript{14} and more.

It was found that Saudi government Twitter accounts, including one belonging to the Ministry of Information, were part of the campaign and also promoted the popular hashtags in posts uploaded in the hours after the arrests. The official account of the Saudi National Council for Combating Corruption issued a call for citizens to be “key partners” in the fight against corruption in the country, and published a telephone number they could use to report cases.\textsuperscript{15} The establishment press was also recruited to demonstrate support, and went above and beyond in its efforts to praise the moves and the “courage” behind such moves, as well as bolstering the image of King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammed.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to unqualified support for the fight against corruption, admiration and sympathy for the heir apparent was palpable. He was portrayed as a hero who took a historic step, by daring to confront powerful princes such as Walid bin Talal and others. Thus, he defended the homeland while fighting the “corrupt traitors” who “looted the wealth of the country.”\textsuperscript{17} Users promised to work with bin Salman “hand-in-hand against the enemies and traitors in the homeland,”\textsuperscript{18} and tweeted loving posts about “the young prince whom history shall remember forever, and the Saudi people will never forget, because he did what others could not do.”\textsuperscript{19} Many tweeted: “Proceed, we are behind you,”\textsuperscript{20} and “30 million people under your command.”\textsuperscript{21} Other users uploaded posters in which bin Salman appeared alongside his grandfather, the founder of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud,\textsuperscript{22} with the aim of presenting him as the successor of the founder of the kingdom. In other pictures, the youthful figure of bin Salman (some of them without a kaffiyeh)\textsuperscript{23} appeared together with
pictures portraying him as an authority figure commanding the military. The excitement over Salman’s moves was so great that the users even published a hashtag asking others to upload the “most beautiful picture of Mohammed bin Salman”.

Negative, though quite marginal, criticism was also expressed. The most prominent voice among these users was Mujtahidd, a mysterious but very popular Saudi Twitter user who has gained a reputation for “revealing corruption” and publishing exclusive stories from the Saudi royal family thanks to his covert sources. A few hours after the developments, Mujtahidd told his two million followers that the purpose of the arrests was not to fight corruption but rather to enable Mohammed bin Salman to take control of the many assets of the arrested businessmen.

bin Salman, who was appointed deputy crown prince and defense minister in 2015 with the coronation of his father, Salman bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, took another step towards the throne in June 2017 when his father ousted Mohammed bin Nayef from the post of crown prince and appointed bin Salman to the post, despite his young age. The latter is considered a popular figure among the younger generation in the country, where the majority of the population is under the age of 30.

With these measures to fight corruption, despite harming the old Saudi elites, bin Salman fortifies his status among his generation, and strengthens support for his future as King of Saudi Arabia, the first from the “grandson generation” of the kingdom. These moves should be examined in light of the demographic and economic context of Saudi Arabia. Some consider the wave of arrests, as well as the reforms led by bin Salman, as a significant message to the younger generation that these are necessary steps for dealing with the future and with a challenging economic reality in which oil revenues are diminishing parallel to a rapid rise in the size of the population.
Cyrus the Great Day: Between Iranian and Islamic Identities

Dr. Raz Zimmn

Cyrus the Great Day, which was marked by Iranians at the end of October, is intended to commemorate the founder of the Achaemenid Persian Empire (539-331 B.C.E.). The custom, which has developed in the last decade but which is not included in Iran’s official calendar, is contrary to the regime’s continued efforts to emphasize the religious-Islamic component of Iranian identity, rather than the cultural-Persian component. Not for nothing did the authorities impose restrictions on the holding of ceremonies near the tomb of Cyrus. These restrictions provoked broad public discourse about the character of Iranian national identity, and opposition from segments of Iranian society, all of which was reflected on social networking sites (SNS).

Cyrus the Great Day is celebrated on October 29. This is the date on which, according to a number of historical sources, King Cyrus began his conquest of Babylon. During the Pahlavi period prior to the Islamic Revolution (1979), Cyrus was highlighted in an attempt to legitimize the monarchy, and create a historical anchor and ideological justification for its policy. After the revolution, the Islamic regime sought to place religion at the center of Iranian national identity, as a reaction to the blatant secularism of the royalist regime, and its efforts to emphasize Iran’s pre-Islamic past. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime was sometimes willing to accept the pre-Islamic cultural characteristics of Iranian identity, especially after the June 1989 death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, despite the reservations that Iran’s conservative religious establishment has about pre-Islamic traditions, such as the Persian New Year (“Noruz”) and the traditional Charshanbeh Suri ceremony for expelling evil on the eve of the New Year, they nevertheless remain.

On Cyrus Day in October 2016, violent clashes broke out between the security forces and thousands of civilians who came to the tomb compound in Pasargadae, Fars province, in southwestern Iran, after several citizens began to shout slogans against the regime. In 2017, the Iranian authorities announced in advance their intention to prohibit the gathering of civilians at the tomb, and even erected roadblocks on the main roads leading to the compound. The Revolutionary Guards commander in Fars province warned that the security forces and judiciary would not allow “anti-revolutionary forces” to hold events near the tomb and undermine the stability of the district. In response, Iranian users launched a campaign on SNS to encourage citizens to participate in events marking the day, and protest the restrictions imposed by the authorities. The users presented Cyrus as an exemplary figure and as a national symbol worthy of commemoration, and
pointed to his historical importance. They condemned the regime’s efforts to prevent the ceremonies in his memory, and uploaded pictures and videos documenting the checkpoints erected on the main roads leading to the tomb. In some photographs, people can be seen continuing through the mountains on foot to reach the compound. Many users compared the restrictions imposed by the regime on the events of Cyrus Day to the numerous and costly efforts that it invested during October to encourage pilgrimages to the holy sites of Shi’a in Iraq during Arba’een, the forty days after the Ashura fast. One of the users complained that the authorities provide pilgrims with free taxis to Iraq, while they close the roads and dispatch helicopters to monitor citizens traveling to the tomb of Cyrus.30

The authorities’ efforts to prevent the holding of Cyrus Day ceremonies prompted widespread public discourse on SNS. Opponents of the regime took advantage of the occasion to protest the Iranian regime, and undermine its legitimacy. They presented the restrictions on holding ceremonies as an expression of the regime’s fear of the citizen protests, and the rule of the clerics as anti-Iranian because it seeks to obscure the national and historical heritage of the people. “Today it has been clearly shown that the Islamic Republic and Iran are not the same,” one user tweeted.31

On the other hand, supporters of the regime portrayed Cyrus Day as a “Western-Zionist” plot, in which opponents of the regime are partners, aimed at undermining the foundations of the government in Iran and harming Islam.32 In response to the efforts to commemorate Cyrus the Great, the conservative cleric and member of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Abbas Ka’abi, said that if Cyrus were to rise from his grave and see the power of Iran under Islam, he would hasten to convert to Islam.33 In his Friday sermon held in Shiraz, Ayatollah Asadollah Imani strongly denounced the day, and claimed that enemies of the regime and Iranian monarchists had created a “fake event” without any historical basis whose roots are “Biblical (Jewish) and Israelis,” in order to sow division among the people of Iran.35

The discourse that developed on SNS following the restrictions imposed by the Iranian regime on Cyrus Day events highlighted the public debate on the regime’s policy regarding Iranian national identity. Sociologist Mehran Solati compared the efforts to prevent commemoration of Cyrus to the Shah’s failed attempts to erase Islamic identity. Solati pointed out that the growing preoccupation with Cyrus Day on SNS proves that the regime’s policy only reinforces the pre-Islamic cultural identity of Iranian citizens. He said that instead of trying to integrate the various components of Iranian identity, the regime is instead trying to “Islamize” Iranian society. As a result, the Tomb of Cyrus has (metaphorically) became a substitute for the Ka’bah in Mecca as a focus of prayer for some Iranian young people.36 The website Tabnak also pointed to the growing importance that many Iranians attribute to the commemoration of Cyrus, and the ineffectiveness of the steps taken by the regime against the ceremonies in his memory. An op-ed claimed that not only does the Iranian people’s respect for the founder of the Persian Empire not endanger Iran’s national security, but that it could also be used to strengthen national solidarity and national sentiment among the country’s citizens.37
The discourse that developed on SNS around the events of Cyrus Day provides further proof of the strength of the national-cultural component in the Iranian identity, which exists simultaneously with the religious-Islamic component, and sometimes even surpasses it. The existence and even the strengthening of pre-Islamic traditions in the Islamic Republic indicate that many Iranians, especially young people, prefer to focus on the unique Persian aspects of their national identity, rather than the Shi‘i-Islamic ones. In this process, SNS serve as a means of exploiting historical events and symbols to construct a national narrative and identity that compete with those that the regime is trying to encourage.
“Erdoğan’s U-turn on Atatürk Avenue”

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak

As it does every year, public discourse on Turkish social networking sites (SNS) during November revolved around the legacy of the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who died on November 10, 1938. Secular users, who call themselves Atatürkists, occasionally organize network campaigns to express their love for and loyalty to the Turkish leader, and further increase their activity in November. Their activity is exploited, among other things, to spread sarcastic messages against the incumbent president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is known for his harsh statements against Atatürk’s legacy. Surprisingly, Erdoğan chose to adopt a different approach this year, and showed a sympathetic attitude toward Atatürk, in a way that stunned both his supporters and his opponents.

One of the most prominent expressions of Erdoğan’s attitude toward Atatürk came in a speech he made in the Turkish parliament in 2013, when he served as prime minister. In that speech, Erdoğan called for reducing the consumption of alcohol by referring to the Islamic ban on alcoholic beverages. His opponents accused him of wanting to enact the law to reduce alcohol consumption because he is an Islamist. In response, Erdoğan harshly criticized the secular camp, saying “they see no problem obeying the law enacted by ‘the two drunks,’ but refuse to obey the divine law.” According to the secularists, Erdoğan purposely used a term that disparages Atatürk and his right-hand man, İsmet İnönü, and would not explicitly call them by name. In a retort to the strident responses to his speech, Erdoğan denied, in a live broadcast, the charges that he had defamed Atatürk. In the same breath, he sent a clear message to his supporters when he refrained from using the family name of the founder of the Republic, Atatürk, which means “father of the Turks.” Instead, Erdoğan, who considers the Ottomans to be his forefathers, chose to call Atatürk by another of his names, “Gazi,” an honorary title awarded to war heroes who were wounded in the line of duty during a military campaign. This divided Mustafa Kemal, the soldier who saved the country from the Allied occupation, from Atatürk, who carried out the profound reforms that turned Turkey into a secular state.

Erdoğan’s cloaked verbal attacks peaked in 2014 when he became president of Turkey and declared the establishment of a “new Turkey.” His opponents criticized him and argued that unlike the “old Turkey,” the new one was not required to fight for its existence. A talented politician, Erdoğan inverted this criticism when he faced the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, which he called the “War of Independence” of the “new Turkey.” In other words, the new Turkey also gained its place and rights through heroic struggle.

The tense atmosphere between the secular camp and Erdoğan’s supporters, which continued into early November, changed its character following the exceptional, pro-Atatürkist speech he gave on November 6. In his speech, he announced his decision to rebuild the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) in Istanbul’s Taksim Square without changing the name of the center, using the family name “Atatürk,” and refrained from the nicknames he previously used when referring to the founder of
the Republic. This move surprised the masses and soon became the most-discussed topic on Turkish SNS. His supporters, though stunned, backed Erdoğan, claiming that the president had always respected Atatürk. The president’s opponents, on the other hand, doubted the truth of his statements, but expressed joy at the decision to leave the name of AKM intact. The masses were surprised again on November 10 when Erdoğan repeated Atatürk’s name on the anniversary of his death, and eulogized him saying, “Alongside commemoration, the Turkish people are obliged to understand Atatürk’s legacy.” Erdoğan did not stop with these remarks, and eulogized him again in a tweet declaring his respect for the memory of the founder of the Republic and the supreme commander in the War of Independence, on the 79th anniversary of his death (pictured).

Many secular users reacted sarcastically to Erdoğan’s remarks and ridiculed him by claiming that he, too, had “finally internalized the right path.” On the other hand, there were quite a few others who sharply criticized the president and accused him of “taqiyya,” which means presenting a false agenda for the success of a covert agenda (the concept is mostly used in the context of Shi’i behavior in a hostile environment), which they suggest he will reveal after the elections in 2019. From their perspective, Erdoğan is using Atatürk as an electoral card in order not to lose votes from the nationalist camp on ideological grounds, and they declared that they do not believe “Erdoğan’s U-turn in Atatürk Avenue.”

Among Erdoğan’s supporters, there were those who quickly adopted the president’s position, as expressed in the Tweeted declaration of their loyalty to, and love for, the founder of the Republic. When this content reached the hands of secular users, they launched a campaign of mockery against “the new admirers of Atatürk,” who they called “two-faced.” Among those included in this category are a famous couple, journalists Nagehan Alçı and Rasim Ozan Kütahtaylı, whose pictures were shared on SNS after they broadcast statements of respect for Atatürk, even though Alçı had previously dubbed him “the tyrant,” and Kütahtaylı had once claimed that the founder of the Republic would receive only 30 percent of the votes if he were to run against Erdoğan. Users also uploaded parallel videos of journalist Turgay Güler, a well-known supporter of Erdoğan. One, taken last year, shows Güler mocking Atatürk Memorial Day ceremonies; in the other, taken after Erdoğan’s sympathetic statements about Atatürk, Güler was seen singing the famous İzmir Hymn, which includes the words “Long live Mustafa Kemal Pasha – Long live!” Severe criticism was also heard of media affiliated with the Erdoğan camp, particularly the newspaper Güneş, which dedicated its first page on November 10 to marking a national day of mourning. Users compared
the way the day of mourning was presented there last year, when it received only marginal attention (pictured).

Erdoğan, who is known for shaping his election strategy according to public opinion polls, has refrained from attacking Atatürk’s image this year, apparently because he has internalized that it does not serve him politically. It seems that despite the bitter rivalry with the nationalist camp, his strategic ambition is not to dismantle it, but rather to pave the way for forging strong alliances with it, which will survive even after the elections in 2019. This proves once again that despite Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership and unquestioning rule, Atatürk’s image remains adored, notwithstanding the profound erosion of his status.

3 4.11.2017: https://twitter.com/Racha93halabi/status/926922224296124416
5 4.11.2017: https://twitter.com/moci_ksa/status/926926106636283904
6 5.11.2017: https://twitter.com/dr_zayedalamri/status/927120318719807488
7 5.11.2017: https://twitter.com/DXFALHALAMER/status/926946321747062784
8 5.11.2017: https://twitter.com/dr_zayedalamri/status/927045932075704322
9 5.11.2017: https://twitter.com/miss9009/status/927031441204097024
10 5.11.2017: https://twitter.com/saud1980_/status/926926106636283904
11 4.11.2017: https://twitter.com/saad676767111/status/928305042486120448
12 5.11.2017: https://twitter.com/faff1436/status/927928142144163845
13 4.11.2017: https://twitter.com/S1A1J1H1/status/92706581718290433
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24 9.11.2017: https://twitter.com/a900587/status/928406085962223616
25 4.11.2017: https://twitter.com/mujtahidd/status/926930733826039808

In this context see, Menahem Merhavy, “National identity and historical heritage in the shadow of King Cyrus,” in Liora Hendelman-Baavur, ed. Iran Then and Now: Society, Religion, and Politics (Tel Aviv, 2017), pp. 149-163.


“The question is commemorating Cyrus,” Solati’s Telegram channel, https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=@solati_mehran, October 27, 2017

