Contents

From the Editors................................................................................................................... 1
Turkey Can Ally with Syria’s Kurds Someday – David Pollock............................... 2
The Changing Equation in Cyprus – Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak.................. 7
Notes.................................................................................................................................... 10
From the Editors

Dear Friends,

The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies is proud to present the July 2017 issue of our monthly publication, Turkeyscope. In this issue, Dr. David Pollock from the Washington Institute analyzes Turkish policy vis-à-vis Syrian Kurds by highlighting the challenges, the current modus vivendi and future prospects. The second article by Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak discusses the changing power equation in Cyprus and the role of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean.

Sarah Jacobs contributed to this month's issue as assistant editor.
Turkey Can Ally with Syria’s Kurds Someday

David Pollock

The July 5 headline in Turkey’s Hürriyet newspaper, quoting Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş reads as follows: “Turkey Says It’s Not Declaring War On YPG [Yekîneyên Parastina Gel or People’s Protection Units],” the main Syrian Kurdish militia just across the border. But, Kurtulmuş added, “if Turkey sees a YPG movement in northern Syria that is a threat to it, it will retaliate in kind.”¹

That typically tough yet carefully conditional quote raises a crucial, if often overlooked, factual point. The YPG has in fact not threatened Turkey, nor even Turkish forces inside Syria, ever since 2012. It was in July of that year, exactly five years ago, when the Syrian Kurdish militia took over much of the border area. And it was then that it promised, in an agreement brokered by Turkey’s ally President Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, to focus on Syria exclusively and refrain from attacking Turkey – or even from supporting attacks against it by the YPG’s parent movement, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

All through the past five years, the YPG and its affiliated political party, the PYD, have fulfilled that promise. To be sure, the Turkish government no longer public acknowledges this fact. But it used to, as recently as late 2015, when Turkey’s own peace dialogue with the PKK collapsed. That experience suggests that such an entente between Ankara and the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or Democratic Union Party) could come again.

Indeed, Turkey’s long-term goal, supported by the U.S. and other friends, should be to nurture a relationship between those two current enemies resembling Ankara’s highly amicable ties with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds were also outright enemies less than a decade ago. But they went through an historic, and mutually greatly beneficial, transformation to get where they are today: the closest of friends in the region, economically, militarily, and politically. In the long run, that is an achievable goal for Turkey and the Syrian Kurds as well. Even a leading AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) official, Mehmet Şimşek, has publicly acknowledged that this could eventually become the desired outcome of this currently acute conflict.

The trick will be to further increase the distance between the Syrian Kurds and the PKK, thereby moving toward Turkey’s acquiescence, and eventually even alliance, with friendly Kurdish-controlled territory to the south. If this sounds utopian, it isn’t. Rather, it parallels what has occurred in the past decade, with quiet but strong U.S. support, along Turkey’s border with the KRG. The exceptionally warm ties between Ankara and Erbil, even in the face of new public tensions over the KRG’s proposed September 25, 2017 referendum on independence, strongly suggest that this particular “age-old ethnic conflict” need not be an insurmountable obstacle to strategic

¹ The author notes that this quote raises a crucial, if often overlooked, factual point. The YPG has not threatened Turkey or its forces inside Syria since 2012, and this agreement brokered by Turkey’s ally President Masoud Barzani in Iraq in 2012, promised to focus on Syria exclusively and refrain from attacking Turkey or supporting attacks by the YPG’s parent movement, the PKK. This agreement was recently renewed and endorsed by Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmuş, in July 2017. The Turkish government no longer publicly acknowledges this fact, but it used to do so as recently as late 2015, when Turkey’s own peace dialogue with the PKK collapsed.

² The author argues that Turkey’s long-term goal should be to nurture a relationship with the Syrian Kurds that resembles its highly amicable ties with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. This relationship has been strengthened through quiet but strong U.S. support along Turkey’s border with the KRG. The exceptionally warm ties between Ankara and Erbil, even in the face of new public tensions over the KRG’s proposed referendum on independence, strongly suggest that this particular “age-old ethnic conflict” need not be an insurmountable obstacle to strategic cooperation.

³ The author emphasizes that the trick will be to further increase the distance between the Syrian Kurds and the PKK, thereby moving toward Turkey’s acquiescence, and eventually even alliance, with friendly Kurdish-controlled territory to the south. If this sounds utopian, it isn’t. Rather, it parallels what has occurred in the past decade, with quiet but strong U.S. support, along Turkey’s border with the KRG. The exceptionally warm ties between Ankara and Erbil, even in the face of new public tensions over the KRG’s proposed referendum on independence, strongly suggest that this particular “age-old ethnic conflict” need not be an insurmountable obstacle to strategic cooperation.
expedience. Someday, believe it or not, Turkey may find an autonomous Kurdish region on its Syrian border every bit as amenable to its interests as the one on its Iraqi border.

**Turkish Views of the PYD: Keeping Up with New Realities**

True, there are major differences between these two Kurdish cases on Turkey’s borders. The PYD, unlike the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) or PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, shared a history and an ideological affinity with Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK movement he founded inside Turkey, which that country’s government labels a terrorist group. Moreover, Öcalan himself was active in Syria from about 1988 to 1998, when he fled only to be captured and imprisoned in Turkey ever since. And the PYD still considers itself an offshoot of the PKK, continuing even now to express sympathy and concern over Öcalan’s plight, as it did in its latest congress in Brussels in September 2016.

Complicating the situation, from Turkey’s perspective, many Syrian Kurds have long had family and other ties with Kurds across the border to the north. The roughly three million Syrian Kurds, unlike the more numerous Kurds in Iraq or Iran, speak the same Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish as do most of Turkey’s 15 million or so ethnically Kurdish citizens. Individual members and fighters from the PYD and the PKK continue to drift between the two. And the PKK leadership holed up in the remote Qandil mountains near the KRG borders with Iran and Turkey continues to have some influence on PYD decisions.

Nevertheless, as the PYD achieved military success, U.S. support, and de facto autonomy for Syrian Kurds – its main constituency – over the past five years, it became more and more distinct from the PKK, forming its own structures and geographically defined self-interests inside Syria, outside Turkey’s borders. The PYD now has its own political and military chain of command, distinct from its PKK roots. Their leaderships differ not only in personnel but also in policies.

As Salih Muslim, the PYD’s co-president (along with the ideologically obligatory but nominal female counterpart) and other officials have described to the author in convincing detail, local PYD chiefs and councils inside Syria function separately not just from any outside fiat but even from each other. Local PYD rulers may be rough, “but at least they don’t chop heads,” as Muslim memorably wrote to the author. And even if the Qandil crew continues to exert its influence on PYD operations inside Syria, the actual policies they all pursue there are directed at maintaining and expanding their control in Syria, not at attacking Turkey or helping the PKK do that on the other side the border.

Indeed, the PYD-controlled border zones are ones where guns, drugs, and money are not being smuggled into Turkey. This is not just the author’s personal opinion. It is a judgment reflecting the evidence presented by Turkey’s own intelligence analysts at a private briefing I attended last year. And it is also the judgment of Amb. James
Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to both Turkey and Iraq and Deputy National Security Advisor, as expressed in a presentation to the major pro-AKP SETA foundation this year.

The PYD has kept the deal it made in 2012 to avoid attacking Turkey precisely because that reflects the PYD’s new self-interest: protect its own turf inside Syria, rather than carry the Kurdish struggle across the border. This makes the PYD and YPG potential partners with Turkey, rather than threats to it, in securing their common frontier against the PKK, IS, or other adversaries. In the long run, this is “mission very difficult,” but not mission impossible. To buttress this unconventional wisdom, it is most useful to take a brief look back at a time, not so long ago, when Ankara apparently agreed with this more optimistic assessment.

*Recent Background: Turkey-PYD Rapprochement, 2012-2015*

For the four years until late 2015, the Turkish government recognized, at least in practice, the new set of facts regarding the Kurds in Syria. It welcomed Salih Muslim for talks in Turkey on several occasions, and accepted PYD control over most of the Syrian border zone. As recently as September 2015, Turkey allowed several thousand Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to transit its territory en route to helping the PYD/YPG liberate the Syrian border city of Kobane from ISIS rule. Moreover, at the same time, Ankara did not retaliate against U.S. airstrikes and weapons drops on behalf of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a blend of YPG (80%) and local Arab and other militias (20%), notwithstanding loud and continuing public protests.

By February 2016, even Turkey’s initial redline of “no YPG west of the Euphrates” was tacitly modified to allow a “temporary” and successful YPG assault against IS in Manbij, a strategic crossroads town across the river and just thirty miles south of the Turkish border. In August 2016, just a month after the failed coup attempt inside Turkey, Ankara did send its troops into Syria to capture an enclave, the Azaz-Jarabulus corridor, dividing the western PYD canton of Afrin from the eastern ones of Jazeera and Kobane, thus preventing the Kurds from controlling the entire Syrian-Turkish border area. But Turkey did not attack SDF forces en masse, and the two sides have settled into an uneasy standoff inside Syria.

*Turkey-PYD modus vivendi, 2016 to date*

At the official level, Turkish-PYD relations broke down exactly as Turkish-PKK talks collapsed in late 2015. As Turkey and the PKK entered into armed conflict after two years of promising peace talks, Ankara and the PYD adopted a hostile tone toward each other, reverting to the rhetoric of “terrorists” and “oppressors.” But all is not lost. The two sides have for the most part avoided direct clashes across their common de facto and de jure border, even though small-scale, scattered skirmishes between them inside Syria persist. When the PYD belatedly withdrew some of its forces from Manbij, at U.S. and Turkish behest, Ankara publicly acknowledged that positive turn.
And it announced that it could conceivably work with Arab SDF troops, though not with their Kurdish YPG commanders.

Even more to the point, despite continuing vocal objections, Turkey has stood by as the SDF, meaning mostly the YPG, moved in force—and with substantial U.S. support, including direct deliveries of some heavy weapons—against the ISIS capital of Raqqah in mid-2017. Turkey did not send more troops south to confront this major development it had gravely warned against; Incirlik air base remained wide open for U.S. use; and Erdoğan visited President Trump in Washington on schedule anyway. Even now, as previewed at the top of this essay, Turkish warnings are consistently couched in the conditional language of “we will respond if the YPG attacks us,” rather than in terms of absolute opposition.

Thus Turkey’s actions, as distinct from its words, suggest it actually has internalized that the PYD/YPG are not a threat, at least not now. It realizes that the movement of Syrian Kurdish troops south toward Raqqah is vastly preferable to their movement north toward the Turkish border. And Turkey understands as well, again despite angry verbal outbursts, that it best not jeopardize its fundamental American alliance over this particular Kurdish bone of contention. With these facts in mind, let us now turn from the complex past and the murky present to the medium-term future, always so easy to predict in the Middle East.

Future Prospects and Policy Implications

Turkey’s medium-term options in this arena are, as argued above, heavily influenced both by realities on the ground in Syria and by American policies in that theater. Viewed from Washington, the main rationale for supporting the PYD, YPG and allied Arab and other militias is security, period. It is not an attempt to drive a wedge between the U.S. and our very important NATO ally Turkey. It is simply a way of fighting effectively against ISIS, while also directing Syrian Kurdish aspirations not against Turkey, but in favor of Kurdish autonomy inside Syria. As such U.S. support for the PYD and YPG, even assuming it continues after Raqqah is liberated and ISIS is defeated, is not a threat but actually an advantage to Turkey’s national security. The Turkish government rejects that view today, at least publicly, but I would argue that it is grudgingly prepared to accept it, at least privately. That assessment is shared by a prominent young Turkish scholar and former parliament member, Aykan Erdemir, who recently asserted in a public Washington, DC forum that:

“Although it is a major challenge to the Turkish government domestically – that is, they do have to keep posturing, they do have to keep up a strong anti-American rhetoric at home – when it comes to global politics, I think they are willing to live with this decision. I think they also see this as tactical because they themselves know what it means to work with PYD and YPG in a tactical manner.”
So, at least under the most plausible near-term scenarios, Turkey’s U.S. connection is likely to weigh in favor of continued tacit acquiescence in some form of Kurdish de facto autonomy, under PYD control, in pockets of Syrian territory along the Turkish border. This of course presupposes that the U.S. will keep the PYD firmly on notice that, in return for U.S. military aid and diplomatic support for an eventual “federal” political solution in Syria, the PYD must continue to refrain from any attacks on Turkish forces and any material support for the PKK. Beyond this immediate calculation, Turkey’s behavior will probably reflect two other major variables linked to the Kurds, both inside and outside the country.

First, Turkey would do well to keep in mind that Kurdish political and military interests writ large have diverged geographically, especially in the past five years. Just as Syria’s Kurds, along with their parties, movements, militias, and institutions, are increasingly distinct from Turkey’s own Kurdish citizens, so too are they even more sharply distinct from their Kurdish cousins in Iraq. Indeed, most Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have chosen to downplay the pan-Kurdish dream in favor of separately seeking their rights inside (or, in the KRG case, perhaps outside) their respective countries. This emerging new reality gives Turkey more room to maneuver on these issues, and in particular to work steadily to separate the PYD from the PKK instead of intermittently lumping them together.

But Kurds are still Kurds, and in particular the closely related Kurds in Syria and in Turkey are probably destined to remain linked at least in some indirect fashion. Inside Turkey, for the time being, both Ankara and the PKK have tragically abandoned their halting rapprochement of 2013-15 and resumed outright low-intensity war. The gap between the two, apparently narrowing just two years ago, now seems almost impossibly wide. Yet it might some day be bridged—if not perhaps with the PKK then with other authentically Kurdish parties or popular movements. Any progress here, in addition to its intrinsic value, would also clearly mitigate Turkish fears and suspicions about the PYD across the border.

That one more reason why the U.S. should advise its Turkish friends privately to resume an internal peace process with the Kurds, and to offer tangible American assistance with that, if desired. This is one case where the cliché of “no military solution” really does apply. And even more so in regard to the Syrian Kurds, Turkey has no good reason to seek such a solution, and every reason to pursue peaceful coexistence across a common and potentially even cooperative border.

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The Changing Equation in Cyprus
Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak

Due to its geostrategic position in the eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus has functioned as a magnet for great powers throughout history, ranging from the Romans to the British Empire. Today, the island is inhabited by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, both of whom have historical claims to the land based on the legacies of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires’ imperial past.

The friction between the island’s communities first became evident when Greece declared independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821. Then, the Greek Cypriots sought to unite the island with Greece, a goal which was later associated with the political ideal of “Enosis” (Union). The Greek separatist trend continued under British rule. Britain’s traditional “divide and rule” method further deepened the rift between the two communities. The Greek Cypriots’ calls for “Enosis” with Greece were answered by the Turkish Cypriots' demands for “Taksim” [partition].

To a certain extent, this predicament was averted with the enactment of the Treaty of Zurich and the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960, both of which paved the way for Cyprus’ independence, while simultaneously granting Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom rights to intervene in Cyprus' affairs in cases of aggression.

The island’s fragile modus vivendi deteriorated as political deadlock between the Greek and Turkish politicians became routine and intra-communal violence spiked, with the formation of armed guerilla groups on the both sides. The tension between the two parties entered a new phase on July 15, 1974, when a Greek military junta toppled the Greek Cypriot President Makarios III and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, a Greek Cypriot militant committed to the “Enosis” ideal. For Ankara, this coup was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Five days later, Turkey conducted an amphibious landing on the northern shores of the island, exercising rights derived from the Treaty of Guarantee. However, Turkey's operation lost legitimacy when it resumed the fighting during the peace conference in Geneva.

Since then, the island and its capital city, Nicosia, have been bifurcated, with Greeks in the south and Turks in the north. In 1980, following population exchanges, the Turks established their own sovereign state, called "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC), which is not recognized by any state other than Turkey. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots in the south inherited the name "the Republic of Cyprus" (RoC), and from the international community's perspective, act as the island's sole legal entity.

Until this point in the island's history, the Cypriot question was a resolvable ethno-religious inter-communal conflict, due to population exchange, lack of daily violence, and, more importantly, lack of sacred sites - granting the parties flexibility on possible land swaps or jurisdiction transfers.
However, the situation underwent a drastic change in February 2003, when the RoC signed an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) border agreement with Egypt. This agreement led to pivotal EEZ agreements with Lebanon in 2006 and Israel in 2010. After securing its southern and south-eastern EEZ borders, RoC divided its EEZ into 13 blocks and awarded the American Noble Energy Company with rights to extract natural gas. The most significant development took place on December 2011, when Noble announced natural gas discovery in the block 12, which is known as “Aphrodite.”

Aphrodite's geographic proximity to the rich Israeli “Leviathan” and “Tamar” natural gas fields has greatly enhanced the block's significance. Identifying a dramatic change in the power equilibrium, Turkey refused to recognize the Greek Cypriot's EEZ and bilateral agreements with the other eastern Mediterranean states. Instead, TRNC published its own EEZ map with F and G blocks overlapping with RoC’s 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, and 13 blocks (see map above). Turkey attempted to delegitimize RoC’s natural gas program with political statements and naval demonstrations of power in the eastern Mediterranean, while dispatching its seismic ship “Piri Reis” to search for regional natural gas reserves.2

It is also important to note that while these tensions were developing, Israeli-Turkish relations suffered a serious blow, with the May 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis. This unprecedented crisis reached its peak when the Turkish government, under former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, imposed sanctions against Israel, while assigning the Turkish navy to secure the right of navigation in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis Israel further toughened when the Ankara government openly declared that the Turkish Armed Forces’ (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri – TSK) NATO based friend and foe identification software system was replaced with one made in Turkey.3 Thereby, the new system provided the TSK with the ability to open fire on the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Greek air force during potential dogfights over the Aegean Sea.

Indeed, the crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations was largely welcomed by Greece and the RoC. Ironically, Ankara’s disproportionately pro-Palestinian stance helped craft a new partnership between Jerusalem, Nicosia, and Athens. Ankara’s ideological policies, such as supporting Hamas and delegitimizing Egypt’s al-Sisi in the aftermath
of 2013 coup, lacked realpolitik and further deteriorated Turkey’s strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean. This atmosphere provided Athens, Nicosia, and Jerusalem with a common denominator, producing cooperation in many fields, including natural gas projects. Trilateral summits bore fruit in April 2017, when Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz signed an agreement on a pipeline of 2200 kilometers connecting Israel to Italy via Cyprus and Greece – world’s longest pipeline.\(^4\) Unsurprisingly, Turkey did not respond docilely, instead launching operation “Mediterranean Shield” and dispatching its navy to the region.\(^5\) In addition, Turkey sent its new sophisticated seismic ship “Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa” to the region to claim disputed EEZ blocks.\(^6\) Moreover, in order to send a clear message to RoC, on April 17, the TSK launched the “Bülent Erdem” (named after a Turkish soldier killed in the 1974 War) amphibious military landing drill in western Turkey.\(^7\)

Despite the pressure it exerted, Turkey did not achieve the concrete success of drastic policy change in Nicosia. The recent unsuccessful June 28 peace negotiations between the RoC and the TRNC can be seen as another indicator of the RoC’s growing self-confidence, to a great extent the result of the RoC’s European Union membership. It is also quite likely that the Israeli-RoC-Greek-Italian pipeline will further fortify the RoC’s position against the TRNC and Turkey. Additionally, changing alliances provide Israel with important leverage on the island. In the short run, this new atmosphere has already paid off for Israel. For example, on March 28, Greece’s air forces hosted the Israeli air force in a joint military drill.\(^8\) Later, on June 10, the RoC opened Cyprus’ “Lebanon-like” mountainous terrain to IDF military training.\(^9\) Indeed, this trilateral military cooperation serves as a replacement for the Israeli-Turkish military cooperation that ended in 2009, when Turkey unilaterally cancelled Israel’s attendance at the “Anatolian Eagle” military drill in the city of Konya.

Despite tiffs, it is crucial to state that Israel and Turkey managed to end their diplomatic crisis last year. While relations between the two countries are not at their best, compared to relations during the 1990s, urgent common interests, like tourism and energy, are important areas of cooperation. As such, despite having signed an agreement with the RoC, Greece, and Italy, Israeli energy minister Yuval Steinitz nonetheless visited Turkey in October 2016 and July 2017. During his last visit, the Israeli minister announced Israel’s intention to conclude the Israeli-Turkish pipeline agreement, while assuring that it would not come at the expense of the Israeli-RoC-Greek-Italian pipeline.\(^10\)

If Jerusalem were to construct both pipelines, it could alter the essence of the Cypriot equation and maximize Israeli interests vis-à-vis Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia respectively, creating a genuine inter-dependency which will eliminating all future uses of the pipelines as a means of exerting pressure.

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Notes


4 John Reed, “Israel signs pipeline deal in push to export gas to Europe,” Financial Times, April 3, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/78ff60ca-184c-11e7-a53d-d0f09f373be87.


