

Bayan بیان ביאן The Arabs in Israel הערבים בישראל

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Table of Contents

From the Editor's Desk2

**Arik Rudnitzky / Is there anything new in Mansour Abbas'
declaration concerning the "Jewish State"?3**

**Michael Milshtein / "The New Way": The Key to Understanding
Ra'am's Strategy.....9**

From the Editor's Desk

The current issue of *Bayan* is being published more than six months after the creation of the government, which for the first time includes an Arab party (Ra'am) as well as Arab members of Jewish parties. This special issue includes two articles that discuss the ideological and political characteristics of the Ra'am party, which is the political arm of the Islamic Movement, headed by Mansour Abbas .

The first article, by **Dr. Arik Rudnitzky**, examines the declaration by Abbas regarding the Jewish State from a historical point of view. The second, by **Dr. Michael Milshtein**, analyses Ra'am's political strategy, which is referred to as "The New Way".

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The Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation (KAP) was established in 2004 by the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Tel Aviv University as part of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. KAP is an expansion of the Program on Arab Politics in Israel established by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Tel Aviv University in 1995. The purpose of KAP is to deepen the knowledge and understanding of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel through conferences, public lectures and workshops, as well as research studies, publications and documentation.

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Arik Rudnitzky * / Is there anything new in Mansour Abbas' declaration concerning the "Jewish State"?

The definition of Israel as a Jewish state is a longstanding issue debated in Arab society, even if it has been pushed to the margins in recent years. There are two main ideological streams participating in this discussion: the Communists and the Nationalists, while the Islamic stream pays little attention to the issue.

From a religious perspective, the Islamic stream does not recognize the historical right of the Jews to the Holy Land. On the political and practical level, they accept the situation that Israel is the national home of the Jewish people and that the Jewish majority is exercising its right to self-determination.

Mansour Abbas' declaration is aligned with similar ones made in the past by heads of the Islamic Movement, such as the founder of the movement – Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish, Sheikh Hamad Abu Da'abis and Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur.

The Islamic Movement's charter, which was published in September 2018, is intensely critical of the historical circumstances that led to the establishment of the State; however, it does not propose any changes in the definition of Israel as a Jewish state.

Ra'am took an unprecedented step by joining the coalition last summer. If it turns out that this achieves the goals the party has set for itself, then Ra'am will benefit in future elections.

"The State of Israel was born as a Jewish state. That is the decision of the people and the question is not concerning the identity of the State. It was born that way and that is how it is will remain [...] The question concerns the status of the Arab citizen living in the Jewish State of Israel." This statement was made by MK Mansour Abbas, the Chairman of the Ra'am party, in an interview with the media personality Muhamad Majadla during the Israel Business Conference in December 2021.¹

This statement is exceptional and lies outside the rhetoric that has characterized the discourse of the Arab parties for many years. This is all the more so when it comes from a senior Arab politician who has from a young age been active in the Islamic Movement. Against this background, one can understand why it led to such intense criticism from politicians and senior public figures in Arab society and even from Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority.² Professor Ibrahim Abu Jaber, one of the founders of the Trust and Reform Party (*Al-Wafa' wal-*

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¹ Gad Peretz, "Mansur Abbas: 'The State of Israel is a Jewish state and will remain so. The question concerns the status of the Arab citizen'", *Globes*, December 21, 2021. [Hebrew]

² Jacky Khouri, "Abbas declares that 'Israel is a Jewish state and will remain so' and became the target of criticism – even in his own party", *Haaretz*, December 22, 2021 [Hebrew]; Mohammad Watad, "The Palestinians of 48 reject the declaration of Mansour Abbas regarding the Jewishness of the State", *Al-Jazeera Net*, December 22, 2021. [Arabic]

Islah), a political non-parliamentary body identified with the Islamic Movement headed by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, claimed that Abbas' statement is to be condemned just like the Balfour Declaration and it is perhaps even more dangerous.³ Issam Makhoul, who is an ex-MK from the Hadash party, called Abbas "the good Arab of Israeli politics." Makhoul claims that the Jewish State being recognized by Abbas is galloping toward apartheid, is solidifying the occupation and is inciting against the Bedouin citizens of the State in the Negev.⁴

From a historical point of view, the definition of Israel as a Jewish state is one of the oldest issues in Arab society. The debate around it became even more intense in the 1990s as interest increased in the rights of Arab citizens as a native minority. At the same time, Arab intellectual circles devoted increasing attention to the rights of the Jewish majority in Israel.⁵ The discussion of these questions is an important landmark in the process of shaping the Palestinian national consciousness among the Arab minority in Israel, even if its intensity has declined in recent years and even though it has been pushed to the margins.

The participants in this discussion are the politicians and intellectuals who are identified with two main streams: the Arab-Jewish Communist stream, which is represented in the Knesset by the Hadash party, and the nationalist stream, which is identified primarily with the Balad party. It appears that the members of the Islamic Movement are less involved with these questions since their worldview is based on more religious ideas than on nationalist ideas. What collective rights do the Jews have? What is their right to the Holy Land? The members of the Islamic Movement do not provide any answers to such questions.

The position of the Islamic movement becomes clear from the discussion of questions on the continuum between the purely religious and the nationalistic-political. On the religious level, from which the historical-Islamic narrative with respect to the Holy Land is derived, the members of the Islamic movement do not accept the Jewish religious claim to the Temple Mount, where the Al Aqsa Mosque is located, nor even to the Western Wall, which is known as the Al-Buraq Wall to the Arabs. They don't even recognize the historical right of the Jews currently living in Israel to the Land of Israel, since according to their view god promised the land to the believers – not necessarily the Jews.⁶

To the extent that the discussion shifts from the religious level to the political and more practical level, a different picture emerges. The view of the parliamentary Islamic movement, which is represented in the Knesset by Ra'am, is derived from the

³ Ibrahim Abu Jaber, "An analysis of the declaration by Mansour Abbas", *Mawtani 48 Site*, December 30, 2021. [Arabic]

⁴ Issam Makhoul, "Good Arab Abbas", *Haaretz*, January 12, 2022. [Hebrew]

⁵ Arik Rudnitzky, "*The Arab minority in Israel and the discourse over the 'Jewish State'*" (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2015). [Hebrew]

⁶ For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Arik Rudnitzky, "Do the Jews have a right to self-determination in Palestine? The Islamic discourse in Israel", in Meir Hatina and Muhammad al Atuna (eds.), *Muslims in the Jewish State: Religion, Politics and Society* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 2017), pp. 80–100. [Hebrew]

doctrine of the “Muslim minority jurisprudence”.⁷ In their rhetoric and practice, they adapt themselves to the existing political reality, in which they are an Arab minority that is largely Muslim (84%) and living in a state with a non-Muslim majority. They oppose the Zionist character of the State, which gives national preference to the Jewish majority, and on a fundamental level demand that Israel be defined as a “state of all its citizens”. Nonetheless, and in contrast to the members of the nationalist stream, they do not demand that the character of the State be changed. They acquiesce to the fact that Israel is the national home of the Jews and that its Jewish majority is exercising its right to self-determination.

The explicit recognition by Mansour Abbas of the Jewish State is not new. It was preceded by similar statements by past leaders of the Islamic Movement who expressed their explicit recognition of Israel as a Jewish State and of its right to exist in the Holy Land. In the summer of 2001, the journal of the Islamic Movement, *al-Meathaq*, published an article by Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish (1948–2017), the founder of the Islamic Movement. The vast majority of the article was devoted to outlining the conditions for a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians and first and foremost “a full commitment to the international decisions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on which the State of Israel was established.” It also discussed the relations between the State of Israel and its Arab citizens as follows:

The State of Israel is a binational state, whether the government recognizes it or not. [...] One of the most important factors that can contribute to stability and coexistence between the two peoples in this land is, more than anything else, an immediate declaration that Israel is a democratic state and a state of all its citizens. This does not in any way contradict the fact that this state fulfills the aspiration of the Jews for an independent state, only within the pre-1967 boundaries.⁸

Darwish’s position led several Jewish researchers to the conclusion that not only did he recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel but to some extent he also accepted its Jewish character.⁹

Sheikh Hamad Abu Da’abis, who recently completed a 12-year tenure as the head of the Islamic Movement, explicitly expressed this view in an article published in March 2001 in the Movement’s magazine. He was at that time the head of the Islamic Movement in the Negev and explicitly recognized—even if only indirectly—the Jewish identity of the State:

We are a minority in a non-Muslim country, to which apply many of the Muslim minority laws, as is the case for Muslim minorities in Europe and

⁷ Iyad Zablaka, *Sharia in the Modern Era: The Law for Muslim Minorities* (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2014). [Hebrew]

⁸ Abdullah Nimr Darwish, “The proposed solution and the hoped-for peace”, *Al-Meathaq*, August 24, 2001. [Arabic]

⁹ See Elie Rekhess, “The Islamic Movement in Israel and its ties to political Islam in the territories”, in Ruth Gavison and Daphna Hakcer (eds.), *The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: A Reader* (Jerusalem: the Israel Democracy Institute, 2000), p. 295 [Hebrew]; Hillel Frisch, *Israel’s Security and Its Arab Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 95.

America. Furthermore, our uniqueness arises from the fact that we are a minority in the State of Israel, the only Jewish state in the world, and we are also a minority in our land.¹⁰

Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur, who was the head of the Islamic Movement during 1998–2010, and is considered to be one of the authoritative figures in the Islamic Movement, made similar declarations in the past. In one of his interviews during the 1990s, he stated: “We are not talking about the establishment of an [Islamic] state within Israel. That is ridiculous. It is our lot to live in a state that is fundamentally a Jewish state. We accept that fact. [...] We accept that we are a minority in Israel.”¹¹ In February 2006, prior to the 17th elections for the Knesset, in which he was a member, and while he was the head of the Islamic Movement, Sarsur provided a more detailed explanation:

We in the Islamic Movement support the establishment of a Caliphate but only in the Arab Muslim states. [...] With respect to Israel, we will maintain the Islamic-national entity and we will insist on full rights. It isn't important that this is a Jewish state. As long as it is a democracy, we will demand equality, because we are part of the reality.¹²

But it cannot therefore be concluded that the Islamic Movement is attributing fundamental legitimacy to Israel as a Jewish state. In September 2018, at the conclusion of an ideological process that lasted several years and was fed by the upheavals in the Arab world at the beginning of the decade (the Arab Spring), the Islamic Movement approved a new charter. This large document (73 pages) describes the worldview of the Islamic movement on the religious, social, political and national levels. With respect to the historical circumstances that led to the establishment of the State of Israel, the document states that “the State of Israel is the result of the racist and imperialist Zionist project, rapacious British and Western imperialism and the downtrodden state and helplessness in the Arab and Islamic world. [...] The State of Israel arose as a colonial settlement project after confiscating the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and a life of liberty and independence on its land and in its homeland.” (p. 14)

The charter goes on to intensely criticize Israel's policy towards the Palestinians:

For decades, Israel has adhered to a hostile approach to our people and to the occupation of our land. It commits war crimes against us, takes away our rights, confiscates our land, encroaches on our holy places, desecrates the holiness of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and denies the Palestinians freedom

¹⁰ Hamad Abu Da'abis, “The problems of our being Muslims in a Jewish and democratic state”, *Al-Meethaq*, March 23, 2001. [Arabic]

¹¹ Cited in: Asad Ghanem, *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 126.

¹² Cited in: Binyamin Neuberger, *Arab Society in Israel: Parties and Elections, Leadership and Media*, Volume C, Unit 7: One voice for everyone – parties and elections (Ranana: Open University, 2010), p. 98. [Hebrew]

and independence. It prevents the refugees from returning to their homeland, their land and their homes and prevents the displaced [the “internal refugees”] from returning to their homes and villages. We cannot enter an alliance with it nor identify with its Zionist doctrine, which advocates racism and occupation – not as part of acquiescence to Israelization in its many forms which takes away our identity, our uniqueness and our rights; not in representing or supporting it nor in the justification of its crimes and hostility; not by defending the occupation, the loathing and the discriminatory racist policy; and not by means of serving in the security forces, which are used to oppress our people, solidify the occupation and deny the Palestinians of their freedom and independence. (p. 17)

At first glance, the language of the Islamic Movement’s charter reminds one of the “Future Vision” document that was published in 2006 by the National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities. It stated that “Israel is the outcome of a settlement process initiated by the Zionist–Jewish elite in Europe and the West and realized by colonial countries contributing to it and by promoting Jewish immigration to Palestine, in light of the results of the Second World War and the Holocaust.”¹³ The document continues by proposing to change the definition of the regime in Israel to one of “Consensual Democracy”.

Nonetheless, the charter of the Islamic Movement does not propose changing the character or definition of Israel as a Jewish state. Essentially, the charter’s criticism of the state serves as a justification for the Islamic Movement to participate in the Knesset. The charter provides two justifications for this: First, political participation in the institutions of the State, such as local councils and the parliament, is an option accepted by most of Arab society and therefore it represents a general consensus (*ijmaa’*). Second, the participation of the Islamic Movement in the Knesset in fact mitigates the harm caused to the Arab community as a result of the arbitrary and oppressive actions of the regime. The charter states that at the very least this is an attempt to present “the truth to a discriminatory regime (*kalimat haq ‘ind sultan ja’ir*).” (pp. 17–18)

The conclusion is that even if the Islamic Movement does not ignore its national Palestinian roots and even if it is intensely critical of the State’s character, it does not attempt to ideologically deal with the definition of a “Jewish state”. Instead, it devotes most of its efforts to empowering the Arab community in a way that is consistent with its religious and social worldview. It is against this background that we arrive at the understanding that Mansour Abbas’ statements do not deviate from the Movement’s party line or from similar statements by past leaders of the Movement. What is novel about his statement is not their essence but rather their historical context: In the post-“Nation State Law” era (passed in the Knesset in the summer of 2018) Abbas’ statements were interpreted as providing retroactive legitimacy to that legislation.

¹³ Elie Rekhess, “The Evolvement of an Arab-Palestinian National Minority in Israel”, *Israel Studies*, 12/3 (Fall 2007), pp. 1-28.

The decision by Ra'am, under the leadership of Mansour Abbas, to join the coalition last summer is an unprecedented step in the history of the Arab parties. Although the decision received a significant amount of support on the Arab street, many view it as a gamble. If the coalition succeeds in maintaining unity and to the extent that Ra'am can show achievements for the Arab community in general and its constituency in particular, then there will be a greater chance that Abbas' political gamble will pay off and Ra'am will reap the benefits in coming elections.

Michael Milshtein * / “The New Way”: The Key to Understanding Ra’am’s Strategy

A new book published by Subhi Rayan, a thinker in the Southern Faction of the Islamic Movement, depicts Ra’am’s strategy as a formal doctrine and long-term vision that is meant to deliver solutions to the two main issues facing Arab society in Israel: its loss of direction and political weakness.

Ra’am’s “New Way”, as presented here by Rayan, is embodied in three revolutionary innovations: the change in attitude towards the State among Arab citizens; the aspiration to achieve influence by integrating within the leadership of the regime; and the independence of national decision making for the Arab sector in Israel and the development of political maneuvering ability that will make it possible to maximize benefit to Arab citizens.

The book also describes three strategic goals that Ra’am needs to achieve in the future: to become the political home for the entire Arab population; to tighten its ties with the Jewish population; and to become a role model for Muslim minority communities around the world.

The experiment being promoted by Mansour Abbas is not an isolated political episode but rather it reflects a deeply-rooted process in Arab society in Israel. The success or failure of this project will have a material influence on Jewish-Arab relations and the attitude of Arab society toward the State.

Professor Subhi Rayan is a thinker associated with the Southern Faction of the Islamic Movement in Israel (which Ra’am - the United Arab List - represents) and a senior lecturer at the Al-Qasemi Academic College in Baka Al-Gharbiyya (Israel). Rayan has recently published a book called *Al-Nahaj Al-Jadid – The New Way (or Method)*.¹⁴ The book provides an in-depth analysis—and the clearest one so far—of Ra’am’s strategy and interprets the party’s actions during the past year as the expression of a long-term vision.

The book describes the events in Arab politics in Israel as an outcome of an organized body of thought based on an insightful analysis of the reality in Israel and on the setting of objectives for the future. Already at the start of the book, Rayan makes clear that MK Mansour Abbas, the Chairman of Ra’am, is the thinker behind the strategy he is presenting and its moving spirit and indeed his picture appears on the cover of the book.

Rayan begins his analysis with a description of the double crisis in Arab society in Israel: on the one hand, there is social and cultural friction, largely as a result of the tension between tradition and modernity. Rayan who is identified with the Muslim

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¹⁴ Subhi Rayan, *Al-Nahaj Al-Jadid wa-Qadayya Al-Mujtama' Al-'Arabi fi Israi'il [The New Way and the affairs of Arab society in Israel]* (Kfar Kera: Dar Al-Huda, 2022). [in Arabic]

Brotherhood movement describes this friction as a source of weakness and a loss of direction for Arab society. It is manifested in the undermining of the family unit, the alienation of the younger generation, the weakening of the Arab social and political leadership and the rise in crime and violence in Arab society (Rayan, like Abbas, feels that the full blame for crime cannot be placed on the State; both of them urge Arab society to self-reflect and to recognize its own responsibility.)

On the other hand, Rayan describes a deep political crisis, at whose center are parties that have become addicted to slogans, have lost their ability to influence and get things done and refrain from any self-criticism. These claims are an unsubtle hint to Hadash – the Communist Party and longstanding political rival of the Islamic Movement.

Ra'am's solution to the crisis rests on a combination of realpolitik and Islamic Law. On the one hand, it will liberate Arab citizens from the internal crisis, primarily by encouraging a return to religion, and on the other hand it provides a political paradigm that will allow Arabs to integrate within the government and Israeli society much more effectively than in the past and thus solve day-to-day problems.

The proposed paradigm is essentially meant to mitigate the long-standing tension between the Arab's nationalist-Palestinian identity and his civilian-Israeli identity. Rayan's analysis is reflected in Abbas' approach and he makes clear that in contrast to other Arab leaders—who are forcing the Arab citizen to adhere to his national identity in a way that leads to alienation from the State and traps him in a reality of marginalization—Ra'am is presenting him with a formula for “have your cake and eat it too”, namely a national identity as a Palestinian and a civilian identity as an Israeli (p. 134).

“The New Way” described by Rayan is based on three revolutions that Ra'am is seeking to initiate. The first is a change in the Arabs' view of the State – no longer an effort to undermine its Zionist character and to establish a “state of all its citizens”, but instead the state's recognition of a national minority (*Aqaliyyah Qawmiyyah*) with equal rights and the Arabs' recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, as declared by Abbas in recent months. His statements have generated a storm in both Jewish discourse and Arab discourse in Israel. That approach rests on a multifaceted legal discourse known as “minorities jurisprudence” (*Fiqh Al-Aqaliyyat*) which has developed in recent decades among Muslim communities living in non-Muslim countries, particularly Western ones. These laws present a formula according to which those Muslim communities can maintain their beliefs and their identity, but at the same time can integrate into the societies where they live and achieve influence – with the goal of increasing overall benefit to the Muslim community (*Maslaha*).

The second revolution is to put the last nail in the coffin of the “old Arab politics” which refrains from integration within government and prefers barricading behind protests and slogans. As an alternative, Rayan proposes that Arabs seek influence by joining the ruling establishment. The main objective is for Arabs to become a sought-after source of influence, one that can determine the balance of power between the political camps in any scenario and thus achieve gains for Arab society.

The third revolution is based on the insight that the support of the Arab public is not guaranteed to any political camp and particularly not the Left. According to Rayan, the Left has disappointed the Arabs repeatedly, including during periods when it formed the government. Rayan adopts the call for the “independence of nationalist

decision making”, an old PLO slogan that he uses in order to express the desire of the Arab public in Israel to independently decide its fate, according to its own criteria and its unique circumstances and constraints. In order to further clarify this statement, Rayan explains that the reality of Arab society in Israel is an “unprecedented paradigm in the history of Islam.” (p. 129)

Rayan also calls for the adoption of a more balanced approach to the Palestinian issue: continued identification with their brethren on the other side of the Green Line, but combined with a focus on the problems of Arab society. According to Rayan, the Arab public is demanding that its leadership give it top spot on the agenda, as can be seen in the results of numerous surveys in recent years. In this context, Rayan asks as follows: “Is there any meaning to a homeland without any citizens? And is nationalism only slogans and symbols?”—subtle criticism of the Joint List— “Or is it also improving the situation of citizens living in their homeland and on their land?” (p. 79)

The main issue that Rayan emphasizes is the need to adopt an open-eyed approach and to abandon the dreams of the past. According to him, this point differentiates Ra’am from the other Arab political parties. According to Rayan, Ra’am’s revolution is not a “betrayal”, as its rivals on the Arab street claim, but rather the ability to change according to circumstances, as Arab leaders have always done. As proof, he describes the difference between the policy of the Palestinian Authority today and the intransigent approach adopted by the Palestinians in 1948. He claims this to be an example of changing with circumstances, which is not a “betrayal” but rather a realistic approach that benefits all.

As a member of the Islamic Movement, Rayan feels it is important to provide legal justifications for the arguments he is making and to present them as consistent with the path of Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish, who founded the Islamic Movement 40 years ago. Darwish decided that the movement would accept the existence of the State and would seek to integrate within it.

In the book’s conclusion, Rayan presents dilemmas regarding the future alongside ambitious goals. He presents three overarching objectives: (1) to establish Ra’am as an address for the entire Arab public and not only supporters of the Islamic Movement; to this end, there is a need to reshape the ties between the party and the movement and perhaps even to separate between them (on the condition of course that Ra’am does not lose its fundamentally conservative character); (2) to tighten the bonds between Ra’am and the Jewish public in Israel by nurturing alliances and increasing familiarity with the party and the needs of the Arab public among Jews; and (3) to make the party into a role model for Muslim communities worldwide who live in non-Muslim countries.

As mentioned, the book was written in Arabic and is meant for an Arab audience. The fact that it employs the same arguments as Abbas makes in public—in both Arabic and Hebrew—somewhat blunts the frequent accusations against him that he is speaking with “two tongues” – that he has a secret agenda and hidden motives and is seeking to camouflage the real philosophy and goals of Ra’am.

In his book, Rayan describes the sunset of the old era and the beginning of a new and as yet uncertain one, which is now taking shape. He makes clear to the Arab public that you can’t have your cake and eat it too – you can’t give priority to the Palestinian identity and objectives (sometimes based on identification with entities

that most of the Jewish public define as enemies), support the goal of a “state for all of its citizens” (which most Jews reject) and refrain from integrating within the government, while also gaining influence, achieving legitimacy among the Jewish public and alleviating the distress of the Arab public. This old thesis is no longer valid, and it is in fact an entity that represents the traditional-conservative end of the spectrum in Arab society and is to some extent familiar to the Jewish public that can usher in a new era and preach for change.

The historic attempt led by Ra’am is being made at a fateful junction in time, at which the relations between the Arab public on the one hand and the State institutions and Jewish society on the other are located between a descent into friction and alienation, which are liable to overshadow the gravity of the events in of May 2021, and the creation of balance and a paradigm for stable coexistence between two societies. Abbas’ strategy has met intense opposition from rivals on the Arab street (primarily from the Joint List and the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement), as well as suspicion and attacks from many Jews.

In between them are problems developing that may foil Abbas’ strategy, such as the recent crisis in the Negev due to the disputes over land between the Bedouin public and the State that has not yet been resolved. Abbas’s efforts are therefore not a passing political episode and the path on which it develops may determine whether the relations between Jews and Arab flourish or wither.

Rayan’s call to adopt an open-eyed approach is directed at both sides. Both are continuing their unending and hopeless search for “unicorns”, i.e. ideal partners whose outlooks and goals are consistent with their own, rather than understanding the need for compromise. In most of the Jewish parties, there is a stubborn attempt to identify “Zionist Arabs” who reject their identity as Palestinians, while the Arab parties are looking for a partnership with anti-Zionist Jews whose efforts and positions are rejected by most of the Jewish public. Jewish recognition of Arabs as a minority with equal rights and the Arab recognition of the original character of Israel can serve as a basis for creating a revised and more stable framework for coexistence between the two societies, an issue that has not been resolved since the establishment of Israel and has never been grounded in law.