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## Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation

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June 25, 2025

### Between Two Wars: In-Depth Survey of the Arab Community

75.4% of the survey participants reported feeling personally insecure, and their mood is low, mainly due to violence in Arab towns and the ongoing war. • A large majority (75.2%) stated that the war which broke out on October 7, 2023, adversely impacted Arab-Jewish relations in the country. Nevertheless, 66% believe in Arab-Jewish political cooperation. • 73.3% support the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition to be formed after the next Knesset elections. • The expected Arab voter turnout in the Knesset elections is 57%. • Hadash-Ta'al is projected to win 4.8 seats, Ra'am – 4.3 seats, and Balad – 3 seats (which is below the electoral threshold). • The two most important issues for the Arab public are addressing violence and crime (54%) and ending the war in Gaza (23.2%). • The war between Israel and Iran has not changed the Arab public's political priorities.

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### Main findings

- The war between Israel and Iran did not change the political agenda of Arab citizens on fundamental issues such as the question of joining the government or supporting Arab-Jewish political partnership, though there is a certain impact on the definition of personal identity.
- An overwhelming majority of the Arab public (75.4%) report that their sense of personal security is weak. The two main factors adversely affecting their mood are the high number of violent incidents in Arab towns (41.9%) and the ongoing war (37.6%). At the same time, 64% of survey participants report that their economic situation is relatively good.
- A large majority of survey participants (75.2%) stated that the war that broke out on October 7, 2023, adversely affected relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel; 43.8% of them stated that the relations deteriorated significantly. 35% stated that their sense of belonging to the state weakened following the war that broke out on October 7. At the same time, 53.2% said that the ongoing war did not affect their feelings toward the state.
- Most of the Arab public (66% of respondents) believe in Arab-Jewish political cooperation, but only 40.2% of them believe that there is indeed support for such cooperation among the Jewish public.
- According to the survey participants, the main issues in which Arab-Jewish political partnership could succeed are the following: addressing crime in Arab society (26.8%); amending discriminatory laws against Arab citizens, such as the Nation-State Law or the Kaminitz Law (22.2%); improving the socio-economic situation in Arab towns (14.1%); and strengthening the status of Arab citizens in the public domain (10.1%).
- A large majority (73.2%) support the inclusion of an Arab party in the government formed after the next elections: 41.8% support joining any government that is formed, and 31.4% support joining a center-left government. These rates are similar to findings from previous surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program during the war.
- Looking back on Ra'am's participation in the Bennett-Lapid government (2021–22), 39.1% of the survey participants believe that it was a successful experience overall, while 46.6% do not.
- If elections for the Knesset were held today, the expected voter turnout among the Arab public would be 57%, slightly higher than the turnout in the 25th Knesset elections (53.2%) held in November 2022. In this scenario, Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am are expected to receive 4.8 and 4.3 seats, respectively, from Arab voters, while Balad is just below the threshold with 3 seats. Arab support for the Democrats party gains them only one seat.
- Almost one-third of the survey participants (30.4%) stated that there is currently no politician or public figure who represents them. Nonetheless, the leading figures are Sami Abu Shehadeh (chairman of Balad – 15.5%), MK Ahmad Tibi (chairman of Ta'al – 14.2%), and MK Mansour


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Abbas (chairman of Ra'am – 13.8%). MK Ayman Odeh (chairman of Hadash) receives a lower level of support (8.1%).

- 54% of survey participants stated that the most important issue in the eyes of the Arab public is addressing the problem of violence and crime. A significant proportion (23.2%) cited an end to the war in Gaza as the most important issue.
- The personal identity of Arab citizens consists of three dominant components: Arab identity (36.2%), Israeli citizenship (30.3%), and religious affiliation (21.4%). For a relatively small proportion (9.7%), Palestinian identity is the most important component.

### Public sentiment in the Arab community amidst the ongoing war

An overwhelming majority of survey participants (75.4%) report that their current sense of personal security is weak, with more than half (57.5%) stating that it is very weak. These findings indicate a deepening sense of personal insecurity within the Arab community over the past year. For the sake of comparison, in a survey conducted in December 2024, the percentage of those who reported a weak sense of personal security was 65.8%. This represents a clear deterioration in this metric.




The two main factors adversely affecting the current mood of Arab citizens are the high number of violent incidents in Arab towns (41.9%) and the ongoing war (37.6%). Other factors with lower

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severity include economic distress (9.3%), family or personal problems (6.7%), and tensions with Jewish citizens (3.1%).

The issue of crime and violence in Arab towns continues to be the main factor adversely impacting the mood of Arab citizens. Not only were unprecedented numbers of murder victims recorded in Arab society in 2023 and 2024 (244 and 230 respectively), but the number of murders from January to May of this year (100 victims) is even higher than in the same period last year (90 victims).<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, the recent adverse effect of the war that broke out on October 7 have increasingly impacted the mood of Arab citizens. The proportion of those identifying the war as the main factor adversely affecting their mood has significantly risen—from 24.6% in December 2024 to 37.6% in the current survey. This is clear evidence of the impact of the ongoing suffering of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (due to the war) on the Arab public in Israel.



Fate would have it that the war between Israel and Iran broke out during the collection of data for the current survey, which was conducted by means of telephone interviews among a representative sample of the adult Arab population in Israel (500 participants). Half of the interviews (238 respondents, 47.6% of the sample) were conducted before the outbreak of the war on June 13, and the other half (262 respondents, 52.4% of the sample) during the first few days following the outbreak. As a result, two independent samples were created, thus making it possible to examine the question of whether the outbreak of the war between Israel and Iran influenced attitudes and sentiments among the Arab public, and if so, in what way.

<sup>1</sup> Source of data: The Abraham Initiatives organization. See: *Times of Israel*, June 2, 2025. According to data from the Israel Police for the years 2021–2025, 76% of the 961 murder victims in Israel were from the Arab community. See: *Israel Hayom*, May 26, 2025 [Hebrew].


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It turns out that the war between Israel and Iran had a limited impact on the sense of personal security among the Arab public, which was already low. Before the outbreak of the war with Iran, 73.3% of respondents reported a low sense of personal security, compared to 77.2% after its outbreak. It seems that the worsening of the personal security metric is actually linked to the problem of crime and violence in Arab society: the percentage of respondents who cited the high number of violent incidents in Arab towns as the main factor adversely affecting their mood was higher after the outbreak of the war with Iran (44.8%) than prior to it (38.6%).

It is worth emphasizing that throughout the survey, respondents were asked in a general way about “the ongoing war,” without being explicitly told whether the reference was to the war that broke out on October 7, 2023, between Israel and Hamas (which has not yet ended), or to the new war that broke out between Israel and Iran. In any case, a similar proportion of respondents—36.6% before the outbreak of the war and 38.6% subsequently—ranked “the ongoing war” as the main factor adversely affecting their mood.

In the economic context, it appears that life under the shadow of the ongoing war is proceeding relatively normally: 64% of respondents in the current survey stated that their economic situation is fairly good. Similar rates were recorded in surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program over the past year, i.e. in June (67.8%) and December (65.1%). These findings indicate that the picture in Arab society is not entirely bleak.

**What is your current economic situation?**  
(percent)




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### Arab-Jewish relations, political partnership, and the sense of belonging to the state

A large majority of the survey participants (75.2%) believe that relations between Arab and Jewish citizens were negatively affected by the war that broke out on October 7, 2023; among them, 43.8% believe that those relations significantly worsened. On this question, significant differences emerged according to demographic and political variables. Interestingly, Druze respondents (83.3%) were more likely than Muslims (76.1%) and Christians (56.5%) to think that the ongoing war is negatively affecting Arab-Jewish relations. It is possible that the Druze's deeper familiarity with both worlds—Arab and Jewish society (thanks to their military service)—enables them to better understand how the war has shaped negative attitudes within each group toward the other.


The distribution of responses according to voting patterns in the most recent Knesset elections (November 2022) shows that Balad voters (84.3%) were more likely than voters for other parties—Hadash-Ta'al (77.5%), Ra'am (74.3%), and Jewish parties (79.3%)—to believe that Arab-Jewish relations deteriorated during the war.



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**How were relations between Arab and Jewish citizens  
affected by the war which began on October 7, 2023?  
(by voting patterns in the 25<sup>th</sup> Knesset elections, percent)**

■ Relations improved ■ The war had no impact on Arab-Jewish relations ■ Relations deteriorated




Despite the war's adverse effect on Arab-Jewish relations, it turns out that, at least in principle, a majority of survey participants (66%) do believe in political partnership between Arab and Jewish citizens; one-third of them (33.7%) believe in it to a great extent. In contrast, a quarter of respondents (23.4%) stated that they do not believe in it at all.


Responses to this question revealed significant differences according to demographic and political variables. The proportion of Christians who fundamentally believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership (86.6%) is considerably larger than the proportion of Druze (70.2%) and Muslims (63.6%). It was also found that trust in Arab-Jewish political partnership increases with age. Among the younger age group (18 to 34), opinions on the matter are divided: just over half (55.1%) believe in it, but about a third (31.5%) said they do not believe in it at all—the highest rate among the age groups. In the older age groups, there is a clear majority of those who believe in Arab-Jewish political cooperation.

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**In principle, do you believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership?**  
(according to religious affiliation, percent)




**In principle, do you believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership?**  
(according to age group, percent)



The highest level of belief in Arab-Jewish political cooperation was recorded among Hadash-Ta'al voters (75.8%) and Ra'am voters (74.3%). This finding is not surprising, given that this idea is a key component of their political platforms. They are followed by voters for Jewish parties (68.7%) and Balad voters (60.8%), and lastly those who did not vote in the last elections (54.7%). It is worth noting that the highest level of skepticism in Arab-Jewish cooperation was observed among those who did not vote in the last elections (42.2%). This may help explain their decision not to vote.



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
The survey participants were then asked about their opinion on whether there is support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership. Opinions on this question were divided. 40.2% believe that such support exists among the Jewish public; most of them (35%) think that the level of support is limited. In contrast, 55.1% believe that there is little if any support for the idea among the Jewish public; 33.1% of them are convinced that there is no support at all.

This question revealed differences according to religious affiliation and voting patterns in the Knesset elections. A small majority of Christians (53.5%) and nearly half of Druze respondents (46.1%) believe that there is support for Arab-Jewish political partnership among the Jewish public. Muslims are more pessimistic: a majority (57.3%) do not believe such support exists. Among voters of Jewish parties, opinions are split—half believe there is support among the Jewish public, and half do not. Voters for Arab parties are more pessimistic, with the most pessimistic being Balad voters: 68.8% of them believe there is no support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership.

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
**In your opinion, is there support among the Jewish public  
for Arab-Jewish political partnership?**  
(by religious affiliation, percent)

■ Yes ■ No



**In your opinion, is there support among the Jewish public  
for Arab-Jewish political partnership?**  
(by voting patterns in the 25<sup>th</sup> Knesset elections, percent)

■ Yes ■ No



This question revealed significant differences in the views of the Arab public following the outbreak of the war between Israel and Iran. Before the war, 53.1% of respondents believed there is no support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership, while after the war that figure rose to 56.8%. The most notable increase was among those who do not believe that there is any support among the Jewish public: from 25.9% before the war to 39.6% afterward.

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Even though the overall balance between optimists and pessimists in the Arab public regarding Jewish support for political partnership did not change dramatically, the pessimists became even more pessimistic on this issue following the outbreak of the war with Iran.

It can be assumed that this shift occurred in the wake of the tragic incident on June 14 in Tamra, in which four members of the same family were killed when their home was directly hit by a missile launched from Iran. In addition to the tragedy itself, racist reactions were documented from some nearby Jewish residents who expressed joy over the missile strike in the Arab city. These racist responses were widely condemned among the Jewish public, including by President Yitzhak Herzog. However, the survey findings indicate the negative impact of these events—especially during times of crisis. The missile strike in Tamra occurred on the day that the second phase of the survey data collection began (after the outbreak of the war with Iran), and it is reasonable to assume that it influenced participants' responses to this question.

### Is there support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership? Breakdown of responses before and after the outbreak of the war with Iran.

Response	Before (N=238)		After (N=262)		Change in percentage points
High level of support	4.4%	<b>40.5%</b>	6.0%	<b>39.9%</b>	+ 1.6
Low level of support	36.1%		33.9%		- 2.2
Very little support	27.2%		17.2%		- 10.0
No support at all	25.9%	<b>53.1%</b>	39.6%	<b>56.8%</b>	+ 13.7

In which domain is Arab-Jewish cooperation most likely to succeed? This question referred to cooperation in general, not necessarily in a political context. A majority of survey participants (61.2%) believe that the greatest chances of success lie at the individual level—that is, in domains that involve personal relationships between Arab and Jewish citizens. One-third (33.1%) pointed to shared workplaces as the domain with the highest potential for success, and an additional 19.9% pointed to personal initiatives by Arab and Jewish citizens. Another 8.2% identified cooperation between students as another domain with a high potential for success.

A smaller proportion of participants (21.1%) believe that the highest chances for success lie in the political arena—either at the national level, such as the Knesset or government (15.5%), or at the municipal level, through cooperation between Arab and Jewish local authorities (5.6%). Other possible domains for successful cooperation include civil society (7%) and interfaith dialogue (2.9%).

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### The personal domain - 61.2%

- The workplace - 33.1%
- Personal initiatives by Arab and Jewish citizens - 19.9%
- Cooperation among students - 8.2%

### The political domain - 21.1%

- The Knesset or the government - 15.5%
- Cooperation between local authorities - 5.6%

### The civil society domain - 7.0%


- NGOs and civil society organizations - 7.0%

### The interfaith domain - 2.9%


- Interfaith dialogue - 2.9%

### In which domain does Arab-Jewish cooperation have the highest chance of success? (by religious affiliation, percent)

■ The personal domain ■ The political domain ■ The civil society domain ■ The interfaith domain




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In the political sphere, survey participants were asked to identify the most likely benefit from successful Arab-Jewish political partnership. The responses reveal a wide range of issues that are high on the agenda of the Arab public. Two issues that received a relatively high weight were addressing crime in Arab society (26.8%), and amending laws that discriminate against the Arab public, such as the Nation-State Law or the Kaminitz Law (22.2%).<sup>2</sup> Other prominent issues include improving the socioeconomic situation in Arab towns (14.1%), and strengthening the status of Arab citizens in the public domain in Israel (10.1%).

<sup>2</sup> The Kaminitz Law, officially called Amendment 116 to the Planning and Construction Law, is a 2017 Israeli law that significantly increased penalties for illegal construction. It is designed to strengthen the enforcement of planning laws, with the most notable impact being on Arab communities.

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


It appears that the responses largely mirror the issues that were assigned a high priority by the respondents. This conclusion emerges from an analysis of the responses according to religious affiliation and voting patterns in the last Knesset elections. For example, the two main areas in which Druze respondents believe an Arab-Jewish political partnership would succeed are the amendment of discriminatory laws such as the Nation-State Law or the Kaminitz Law (35.7%), and improvement of the socio-economic situation in Arab towns (30%). These figures are significantly higher than the sample average. This is not coincidental, since these are the two most pressing issues on the Druze community's agenda.

A further example is Balad voters who stress their Palestinian identity and believe that one of the main areas in which political partnership might succeed is the promotion of a peace process with the Palestinians (17.6%). This figure is three times higher than the sample average.


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**In which area is Arab-Jewish political partnership  
most likely to succeed?**  
(by religious affiliation, percent)



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**In which area is Arab-Jewish political partnership  
most likely to succeed?**  
(by voting patterns in the 25th Knesset elections, percent)







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One-third of the survey participants (35%) stated that their sense of belonging to the state weakened due to the war that broke out on October 7, 2023, while only 9% said their sense of belonging to the state in fact strengthened. The most significant finding is that for the majority of survey participants (53.2%), the war did not affect their feelings toward the state one way or the other. It is possible that the war simply confirmed their pre-existing feelings toward the state, whether positive or negative. This response is dominant among Muslims (52.9%), Christians (55.2%), and Druze (54.8%). However, the proportion of Druze who said their sense of belonging to the state strengthened during the war (31%) is significantly higher than the proportion of Muslims (6%) and Christians (18.2%) who feel that way.

Hadash-Ta'al voters (50%) reported that their sense of belonging to the state weakened following the war to a greater extent than Balad voters (45.1%) and Ra'am voters (30.7%). Conversely, Ra'am voters (60.4%) reported that the war did not affect their feelings toward the state to a greater extent than Balad voters (51%) and Hadash-Ta'al (42.5%) voters.



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
### Arab participation in Knesset elections and the question of joining the government

According to the survey findings, if Knesset elections were held today, the expected voter turnout among Arab voters would be 57%. Based on these findings and past experience, it is estimated that if the three Arab parties—Hadash-Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad—ran separately, as they did in the last elections held in November 2022, Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am would be expected to win 4.8 and 4.3 seats respectively, while Balad would be below the threshold with 3 seats.

With respect to Jewish parties, the Democrats party might receive one seat from Arab voters while the Likud, National Unity, and Yesh Atid parties might each receive half a seat from Arab voters.

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**How will Arab voters vote?**  
(by party, number of seats)



Should an Arab party join the coalition formed after the next elections? A large majority of survey participants (73.2%) support such a move; a significant portion of them (41.8%) even support the participation of an Arab party in any coalition that is formed, not just a center-left coalition. In contrast, only 11.3% strongly oppose the inclusion of Arab parties in the coalition, as well as opposing support for the coalition from outside (through a “blocking bloc” in the Knesset).

The highest level of support for the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition was observed among Ra’am voters (90.1%), followed by Hadash-Ta’al voters (77.5%), voters of the Jewish parties (76.5%), and, to a lesser extent, Balad voters (60.8%).

### Should an Arab party join the coalition following the next elections? (percent)

#### Yes, 73.2

Yes, any government that is formed after the elections, **41.8**

Yes, but only a center-left coalition, **31.4**


#### No, 23.0

No, but an Arab party could support the coalition from the outside in exchange for real benefits, **11.7**


An Arab party should not join the coalition or support it from the outside under any circumstances, **11.3**

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**The position of the Arab public as to whether an Arab party should join the coalition formed after the next Knesset elections**  
(by voting patterns in the 25<sup>th</sup> Knesset elections, percent)



**The position of the Arab public regarding an Arab party joining the coalition** (selected years, percent)




The trend that emerges from the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in recent years is clear: a solid majority of the Arab public supports the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition, as in the case of Ra'am following the 2021 elections. Against this backdrop, the following question was presented to the survey participants: in retrospect, was Ra'am's experience in the Bennett-Lapid government (in 2021–22) successful or not?

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It turns out that opinions among the Arab public on this matter are divided: 39.1% of the survey participants believe the experience was generally successful. They base their view on three main arguments: the government seriously addressed problems in Arab society; an Arab party gained political influence; and Arab society benefited from larger budgets. In contrast, 46.6% of the respondents believe the experience was not successful. Some expressed constructive criticism, arguing that Ra'am's achievements were limited and did not meet expectations. Others explained that Ra'am abandoned national issues important to Arab citizens and focused only on civil concerns. Some also criticized the fact that an Arab party like Ra'am had to humble itself before the Jewish ruling parties.


Naturally, there are substantial differences of opinion on this politically charged issue according to voting patterns in the Knesset elections (2022). While a majority of Ra'am voters (69.3%) believe the experience was generally successful, only a minority of Hadash-Ta'al voters (37.5%) and Balad voters (27.5%) think so. On the other hand, a large majority of Balad voters (70.6%), half of Hadash-Ta'al voters (54.2%), and even a small proportion of Ra'am voters (23.8%) believe that, in retrospect, the experience was not successful.

**In retrospect, was the participation of Ra'am in the Bennett-Lapid government (2021-22) a success? (percent)**



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Why was the experience successful? (39.1% of respondents, N= 195)		Why was the experience not successful? (46.6% of respondents, N=233)	
The government dealt seriously with the problems of Arab society.	26.3%	Ra'am's achievements did not meet expectations.	33.3%
An Arab party had political influence.	25.3%	Ra'am ignored the national concerns of Arab voters and focused only on civil problems.	27.2%
Larger budgets for Arab society.	22.6%	An Arab party was subservient to the Jewish ruling parties.	21.8%
An Arab party fulfilled the wishes of Arab voters by joining the government.	12.3%	It provided Arab legitimacy to discriminatory government policy.	9.3%
Greater legitimacy for Arab citizens in the eyes of the Jewish public.	11.1%	Harm to the Palestinian cause.	3.7%




Which party leader or public figure best represents Arab citizens today? Almost a third of the survey participants (30.4%) responded that there is currently no one who represents them. Nevertheless, three Arab representatives lead the list and receive similar levels of support: Sami Abu Shehadeh, chairman of the Balad party (15.5%); MK Ahmad Tibi, chairman of the Ta'al party (14.2%); and MK Mansour Abbas, chairman of the Ra'am party (13.8%). MK Ayman Odeh, chairman of the Hadash party, receives a lower level of support (8.1%).

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This question revealed significant differences according to religious affiliation. Among the Druze, Sheikh Mowaffaq Tarif, the spiritual leader of the Druze community in Israel, receives a particularly high level of support (57%). This reflects the Druze community's grass roots support for the sheikh who has in recent months been tirelessly working to ensure the safety of the Druze in Syria and to strengthen the connection between the two Druze communities (in Israel and Syria). Among Christians, many feel that no one currently represents them (37.4%), yet Sami Abu Shehadeh (19.3%) and Ayman Odeh (17.3%) receive relatively high levels of support. Among Muslims, there is a close tie in levels of support between Sami Abu Shehadeh (16.6%), Ahmad Tibi (16.6%), and Mansour Abbas (15.7%).

Support for the leaders of Jewish parties is very low; nonetheless, the most notable are: Yair Golan, chairman of the Democrats party (4.7%); MK Yair Lapid, leader of the opposition in the Knesset and chairman of the Yesh Atid party (3.6%); and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, chairman of the Likud party (2.6%).




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### The agenda of the Arab public

Addressing the problem of violence and crime continues to top the agenda of the Arab public: 54% of the survey participants ranked it as the most important issue. Alongside it, ending the war in Gaza stands out as an important issue in its own right (23.2%). As we saw above, these are the two main issues currently of concern to Arab citizens, and which adversely affect sentiment in Arab society. The urgency of these two issues in the eyes of the Arab public stems from the fact that both require immediate action, and the Arab public believes that this requires a government decision on the matter.

#### What is currently the most important issue for the Arab public in Israel? (percent)





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
### The question of personal identity

According to the survey findings, the personal identity of Arab citizens is composed of three dominant elements: Arab identity (36.2%), Israeli citizenship (30.3%), and religious affiliation (21.4%). Only 9.7% stated that the most important component is their Palestinian identity.

It should be noted that the Israeli component was presented to survey participants using the term “citizenship” (an instrumental component) rather than “identity” (an emotional component). Nevertheless, the trend emerging from the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program throughout the war indicates that Israeli citizenship has become one of the important components of identity among Arab citizens.

Personal identity is dynamic and highly influenced by external developments, especially during times of conflict. An interesting shift occurred in the current survey (June 2025): under the influence of the war with Iran, the Arab identity component strengthened at the expense of the Israeli citizenship component, while the other two identity components (religious affiliation and Palestinian identity) remained unchanged. Thus, while before the outbreak of the war with Iran there was parity between the Arab identity component and the Israeli citizenship component, after the war a significant gap emerged in favor of the Arab identity component.

It can be assumed that this change reflects disappointment among the Arab public with the state's failure to provide adequate protection to Arab communities during emergencies, leading to a sense that their Israeli citizenship has lost its value.<sup>3</sup> The serious incident in Tamra, mentioned above, has had an impact on this shift.




<sup>3</sup> See: Lital Piller, “Lack of Protective Structures Against Missile Attacks in Arab Localities”, Israel Democracy Institute, June 18, 2025: <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/57071>

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**The breakdown of personal identity components before and after the outbreak of the war with Iran, June 2025**

Component	Before (N = 238)	After (N = 262)	Change (percentage points)
Arab identity	33.6%	38.5%	+ 4.9
Israeli citizenship	32.7%	28.2%	- 4.5
Religious affiliation	21.7%	21.0%	- 0.7
Palestinian identity	9.5%	9.9%	+ 0.4

Arab identity is the dominant component in the identity of voters across all Arab parties. However, among voters for Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am, Israeli citizenship ranks second, while among voters for Balad, Palestinian identity ranks second. Among voters for Jewish parties, Israeli citizenship is dominant, followed by Arab identity.



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The survey was initiated by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, in cooperation with the Israel Office of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

The survey was carried out by the Stat-Net Research Institute under the direction of Yousef Makladeh.

The data were collected during the period June 10-16, 2025, in a telephone survey carried out in Arabic among a representative sample of the adult Arab population in Israel (aged 18+).

Size of the sample: 500. Sample error:  $\pm 4.4$  percent.