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## Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation

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May 12, 2026

### Integration and Influence: Survey of Arab Citizens in Israel

The expected voter turnout in the upcoming Knesset elections is 53%, but if the Joint List is reestablished, it will surge to a record 67%, and the party would win 16 seats in the Knesset • 77.2% of the respondents support the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition to be formed after the next Knesset elections, and 63.7% believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership • 76.9% report a weak feeling of personal security and that their mood is low, mainly due to the high level of violence in Arab society and fears of renewed war in the region • Most of the respondents positively view a political agreement with Lebanon (69.5%) and normalization with Saudi Arabia (67.4%) but most of them (64.4%) also condition this on resolving the Palestinian issue • A large majority (75.8%) support allowing Arab high school graduates to volunteer for national civic service not related to security.

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### Main findings

- If the Knesset elections were held today, the expected turnout among Arab voters would be 53%, a level similar to that in the 25<sup>th</sup> Knesset elections (53.2%) held in November 2022. In this scenario, Hadash-Ta'al (5.3 seats) and Ra'am (4.6 seats) are expected to exceed the electoral threshold, while Balad is not (1.8 seats). In contrast, if the Joint List were reestablished as a union of the four Arab parties (Hadash, Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad), as in the past, the expected voter turnout in Arab society would jump to 67%, the highest level reported in the Konrad Adenauer Program surveys. Such a turnout could give the Joint List 16.3 seats.
- Many members of the Arab public (76.9% of the respondents) report a weak feeling of personal security. The main explanation is the high level of violence in Arab society (51.8%), alongside fears of the outbreak of a new war in the region (21.8%), economic hardship (8.6%), the situation of Palestinians in Gaza (7.4%), and family or personal problems (7.1%). In contrast, most respondents (68.3%) report that their overall economic situation is good.
- A majority of the Arab public (59.4%) believe that the current state of relations between Arabs and Jews is not good. Nevertheless, most respondents (63.7%) stated that they believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership, although only 39.7% believe that there is genuine support for such political cooperation among the Jewish public.
- Half of the respondents (53.3%) stated that their feeling of belonging to the State is strong overall. In contrast, 44.5% reported that it is weak. At the same time, most respondents (75.8%) support allowing Arab high school graduates to volunteer for national civic service not related to security.
- A majority of the Arab public believe that a political agreement between Israel and Lebanon (69.5%) and normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia (67.4%) would be positive developments for the region. At the same time, most of them (64.4%) are convinced that resolving the Palestinian issue must be a prerequisite for such agreements. In addition, nearly half of the Arab public (46.4%) believe that two states based on the 1967 lines is the only realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only 18.7% believe that one state from the river to the sea, shared by Israelis and Palestinians, is the only realistic solution, while 7.1% are in favor of a regional solution through international mediation. In contrast, 21.4% believe that there is no solution on the horizon.
- A large majority (77.2%) support the inclusion of an Arab party in the government to be formed after the next elections: 43.3% support joining any government that is formed, while 33.9% support joining a center-left government. These figures are similar to those of previous surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program over the past two years.

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- A large majority of respondents (71.3%) stated that the most important issue today for the Arab public is addressing the problem of violence and crime. Other issues include resolving the Palestinian issue (8%), addressing problems in education, employment, and poverty (7.4%), as well as regulating planning and construction in Arab areas (6.1%).
- The most prominent component of an Arab citizen's personal identity is their Arab identity (33.3%). Other components include Israeli citizenship (27.7%), religious affiliation (24.5%), and Palestinian identity (13.5%).

### Public sentiment in Arab society

An overwhelming majority of respondents (76.9%) report a weak feeling of personal security, with half of them (52.4%) stating that it is very weak. The main factor responsible for this is the high level of violence in Arab society (according to 51.8% of the respondents). It should be noted that the number of murder victims in Arab society has already reached 100 since the beginning of this year.<sup>1</sup>

Another reason cited by the respondents for their low morale is the fear of a new war breaking out in the region (21.8%). The level in the current survey is significantly higher than that in the previous survey conducted in November 2025 (14.2%). This marked increase in the level of concern is explained by the effects of the recent military confrontation between Israel and Iran (Operation "Roaring Lion"), which began at the end of February and lasted about a month. The direct reason for this concern is the lack of adequate protective infrastructure in Arab towns during emergencies and wartime, as reflected in the shortage of public shelters and protected spaces.<sup>2</sup>

On the economic level, the situation of Arab citizens appears to be relatively good: 68.3% of the respondents report that their economic situation is good overall. This figure is slightly lower than that reported in the previous survey (November 2025: 73.4%), but is similar to the average rate reported in the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program during the most intense period of the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza (June 2024–June 2025), which stood at 65.7%.


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<sup>1</sup> *Times of Israel*, 3 May 2026: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/man-shot-dead-in-shfaram-in-100th-killing-of-2026-in-arab-community/>


<sup>2</sup> According to the State Comptroller Report published in early 2026, there are 37 public shelters in Arab towns, which is 0.3% of the total in Israel (11,775). Eight of them (22%) are not built to code. See: Hila Tsion "Abandoned on the Front Line. 41% of Arabs in Israel do not have access to a bomb shelter." *Ynet.co.il*, March 8, 2026 [Hebrew] <https://www.ynet.co.il/economy/article/yokra14701084>

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**How would you currently define your feeling of personal security?**  
(percent)



**What is the main cause of your low level of morale?**  
(by survey, percent)



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How would you describe your current economic situation?  
(percent)




### Arab-Jewish relations and the issue of political partnership

Most respondents (59.5%) believe that relations between Arab and Jewish citizens are currently not good, while 40% believe they are good overall. The intensity of this feeling increases with level of education: respondents with an academic education (bachelor's degree – 62.3%, master's and doctoral degrees – 70.7%) are more pessimistic on this issue than those with only a primary education (51.8%) or secondary education (55.1%).


On the political level, supporters of Balad (69.6%) and supporters of Hadash-Ta'al (60.7%) are more likely than supporters of Ra'am (56.9%) and supporters of a Jewish party (52.5%) to believe that relations between Arabs and Jews are currently not good.

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**What is the current state of relations between Arab and Jewish citizens?**  
(by level of education, percent)



**What is the current state of relations between Arab and Jewish citizens?**  
(by voting intention in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)




Despite the pessimistic assessment regarding Arab-Jewish relations, most respondents (63.7%) stated that, in principle, they believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership, while 35.6% do not. The distribution of responses in the current survey, conducted about a month after the ceasefire in the war with Iran, is similar to that observed in the previous survey conducted in November 2025, about a month after the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. At that time, 64.6% of respondents said they

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
believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership. The conclusion is that on this fundamental political issue, the attitudes of the Arab public are not necessarily influenced by external events.

As noted, the Arab public overall supports the principle of political partnership, although several differences were found according to demographic and political variables. Among young people aged 18–34, belief in political partnership is slightly lower than among other age groups (59.3% believe in it, 39.1% do not), although the majority still support it. In addition, the percentage of young people who believe in political partnership in the current survey is higher than that in the previous survey conducted in November 2025 (51.6%), while the proportion of young people in the current survey who do not believe at all in political partnership (24.5%) is significantly lower than in the previous survey (33.6%). The findings of the current survey indicate greater openness among young people in Arab society to the principle of Arab-Jewish political partnership, including some who are expected to vote for the first time in their lives in the upcoming elections.

A breakdown according to voting intention in the next Knesset elections found that supporters of a Jewish party (89.6%), supporters of Ra’am (69.4%), and supporters of Hadash-Ta’al (64.3%) believe in Arab-Jewish political partnership more than supporters of Balad (41.5%) and respondents who do not intend to vote in the elections (52.1%).



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


Respondents were asked whether there is support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership. A large proportion of respondents (56.9%) believe that there is no such support; 30.9% are convinced that there is no support at all. In contrast, a smaller proportion of respondents (39.7%) believe that there is, in fact, support for the idea among the Jewish public. It should be noted that the survey conducted in November 2025 also showed that a majority of respondents did not believe there was support for political partnership within the Jewish public; however, the proportion of pessimists in the current survey has grown, while the proportion of optimists has declined.


A breakdown by voting intention in the Knesset elections found that supporters of Ra'am and supporters of a Jewish party are more likely than supporters of Hadash-Ta'al and Balad to believe that there is support for political partnership among the Jewish public. Nevertheless, at least half of Ra'am supporters and supporters of a Jewish party believe that there is no support for the idea among the Jewish public, with the highest level of pessimism on this issue found among Balad supporters (74.5%).

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**In your opinion, is there support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership?**  
(by survey, percent)



**In your opinion, is there support among the Jewish public for Arab-Jewish political partnership?**  
(by voting intentions in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)




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### Sense of belonging to the State and the issue of civic service


Half of the respondents (53.3%) stated that their sense of belonging to the State is strong overall, while 44.5% reported that it is weak. Differences on this question emerged according to demographic and social variables (religion, age, and level of education) as well as political variables. For example, the proportion of Druze respondents who reported a strong sense of belonging to the state (81.7%) is significantly higher than that of Muslims (50.5%) and Christians (53.3%). An issue that appears to achieve a consensus among Druze respondents shows division among Muslims and Christians: nearly half of Muslims (47.6%) and Christians (46.7%) reported that their sense of belonging to the State is currently weak.

No major differences were found according to age group although it can be said that older age groups exhibit slightly stronger feelings of belonging to the State than younger ones. In general, the sense of belonging to the State tends to weaken as the level of education rises. Responses according to intention to vote in the 2026 Knesset elections showed that an overwhelming majority of supporters of a Jewish party (84.7%) and most supporters of Ra'am (66.9%) report that their sense of belonging to the State is strong. Among supporters of Hadash-Ta'al, opinions on this issue are divided, while among Balad supporters a large majority (81.7%) stated that they have a weak sense of belonging to the State.




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
**How would you define your feeling of belonging to the State?**  
(by age group, percent)



**How would you define your feeling of belonging to the State?**  
(by level of education, percent)



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


A large majority of respondents (75.8%) expressed support in principle for allowing Arab high school graduates—both male and female—to volunteer for state-sponsored civic service that is not related to security. 46.9% of them expressed strong support, while only 23.2% expressed opposition. Support for the idea increases with age, and even among young people aged 18–34 there is solid support (69.1%). Moreover, no gender differences were found: 75.3% of men and 77.2% of women expressed support for the idea. On the other hand, support declines as the level of education rises. Nevertheless, support remains strong even among those with an academic education: 64.9% of holders of a bachelor’s degree and 68.3% of respondents with a master’s or doctoral degree expressed support.


Significant differences were found on this issue according to voting intention in the upcoming elections. The highest level of support was recorded among supporters of a Jewish party (98.4%), followed by supporters of Ra’am (83.7%) and to a lesser extent supporters of Hadash-Ta’al (66.9%). Supporters of Balad express the greatest reservations: 51.9% of them oppose the idea.

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**Do you support the idea that Arab high school graduates, whether male or female, will do civic service for the State that is not related to security?**  
(by age group, percent)




**Do you support the idea that Arab high school graduates, whether male or female, will do civic service for the State that is not related to security?**  
(by level of education, percent)



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**Do you support the idea that Arab high school graduates, whether male or female, will do civic service for the State that is not related to security?**  
(by voting intention in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)



### Arab participation in the Knesset elections and the issue of joining the government



The survey asked about two scenarios regarding the organization of the Arab parties in the upcoming elections. According to the first scenario, the Arab parties would run separately in three electoral lists: Hadash-Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad, as they did in the previous elections. Under this scenario, the expected voter turnout among Arab citizens is 53%, similar to that observed in the 2022 elections (53.2%). Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am are expected to pass the electoral threshold (5.3 and 4.6 Knesset seats, respectively), while Balad is not (only 1.8 seats).

According to the second scenario, the Joint List would be reestablished as a union of the four Arab parties (Hadash, Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad), as was the case in several previous election campaigns (2015, September 2019, and 2020). In this case, voter turnout among Arab citizens is expected to surge to 67%, and the Joint List would win 16.3 seats in the Knesset—one seat more than the record achieved in the 23<sup>rd</sup> Knesset elections (2020; 15 seats).

It should be noted that this question was also presented in the previous survey conducted in November 2025, when the expected voter turnout among Arab citizens under the second scenario—with the Joint List running in the elections—was 61.8%. The voter turnout in the current survey is significantly higher than in the previous survey. This can be explained by the fact that in the previous survey this scenario was merely hypothetical, whereas the current survey was conducted at a time when the reestablishment of the Joint List has become a realistic scenario that is being actively

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discussed in Arab society. The survey findings reflect support for the possibility of this scenario materializing, which would inevitably lead to higher participation among Arab voters on election day.



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Respondents were asked whether an Arab party should join the coalition formed after the next Knesset elections. The question was presented in general terms without reference to either of the scenarios described above. A large majority of respondents (77.2%) support such a move; a substantial portion of them (43.3%) even support the inclusion of an Arab party in any coalition that is formed, while the rest support joining a center-left government (33.9%). In contrast, only 18.3% oppose the idea, including 6.7% who oppose both the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition and external support for the coalition by Arab parties (through a “blocking bloc” in the Knesset).

The highest level of support for the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition was found among supporters of Ra’am (95.4%) and supporters of a Jewish party (90.6%), followed by supporters of Hadash-Ta’al (77.2%) and Balad (67.6%). A lower level of support was found among those who do not intend to participate in the next elections (62.6%).


The picture emerging from the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in recent years is clear: support among the Arab public for the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition is stable and consistent, and among supporters of Ra’am it has become a consensus position.

### Should an Arab party join the coalition to be formed after the next elections? (percent)


<b>Yes, 77.2</b>	Yes, any government that is formed after the elections, <b>43.3</b>
	Yes, but only a center-left coalition, <b>33.9</b>
<b>No, 18.3</b>	No, but an Arab party could support the coalition from the outside in exchange for real benefits, <b>11.6</b>
	An Arab party should not join the coalition or support it from the outside under any circumstances, <b>6.7</b>

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**Should an Arab party join the coalition to be formed after the next elections?**  
(by voting intentions in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)



**Should an Arab party join the coalition following the next elections?**  
(by survey, percent)




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### The Arab public's agenda: Violence and crime at the top of the list

An overwhelming majority (71.3%) of the respondents feel that addressing the problem of violence and crime in Arab society is the most important issue currently on the Arab public agenda. Other day-to-day issues—such as regulating planning and construction in the Arab sector or addressing problems related to education, employment, and poverty—also concern Arab citizens (13.5% combined).

Resolving the Palestinian issue has not disappeared from the Arab public agenda: 8% of respondents believe that it is the most important issue. At the same time, only a very small proportion (1.9%) believe that assistance to Palestinians in Gaza is the most important issue. It should be noted that resolving the Palestinian issue is especially important to supporters of Balad: 23.8% of them believe this to be the most important issue, while the proportion is lower among supporters of Hadash-Ta'al (8.5%) and Ra'am (7%).




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### Positions with respect to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and treaties with Lebanon and Saudi Arabia


Nearly half of the survey participants (46.4%) believe that the most realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is two states based on the 1967 lines. Another 18.7% believe that the most realistic solution is one state from the river to the sea, while a small proportion (7.1%) feel that a regional solution through international mediation is the most realistic solution. At the same time, 21.4% of the respondents believe that there is no solution to the conflict on the horizon.

Significant differences were found on this issue according to voting intention in the upcoming Knesset elections: most supporters of Hadash-Ta'al (59.2%) and Ra'am (58.2%) believe that the most realistic solution is two states based on the 1967 lines, and only a minority believe that the solution is one state from the river to the sea. In contrast, among supporters of Balad and of a Jewish party, opinions are divided regarding the most realistic solution to the conflict.

This question has been presented several times in surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in recent years. Until the outbreak of the war in October 2023, only a minority in the Arab public believed that the most realistic solution is two states, while the majority believed that there is no political solution on the horizon. Given the ongoing war, which has become an extended regional conflict, the two-state solution has become the most realistic one in the eyes of the Arab public.



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
In general, the Arab public positively views a treaty between Israel and Lebanon that would stabilize relations between the two countries, as well as a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In both cases, a majority of the respondents expressed positive views: 69.5% view an agreement with Lebanon positively, and 67.4% view an agreement with Saudi Arabia positively. In contrast, about a quarter of the Arab public in each case (25.7% regarding a possible agreement with Lebanon, and 27.5% regarding normalization with Saudi Arabia) do not view these agreements as positive developments. At the same time, most of the Arab public (64.4%) are convinced that resolving the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for both a treaty between Israel and Lebanon and normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Significant differences were found in the responses to these questions according to voting intention in the upcoming Knesset elections. Supporters of a Jewish party and of Ra'am are much more likely than supporters of Hadash-Ta'al and Balad to believe that a treaty with Lebanon or a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia would be a positive development for the region. It should be noted that most supporters of Hadash-Ta'al do in fact view such agreements positively, whereas most supporters of Balad do not.


Most supporters of the Arab parties believe that resolving the Palestinian issue should be a prerequisite for a treaty with Lebanon or a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. In contrast, there are differing opinions among supporters of a Jewish party on whether the signing of such agreements should be conditioned on first resolving the Palestinian issue.

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
**Would a treaty between Israel and Lebanon be a positive development in the region?**  
(by voting intention in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)



**Would normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia be a positive development in the region?**  
(by voting intention in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)



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### The issue of personal identity


According to the survey findings, the main component of an Arab citizen's personal identity is their Arab identity (33.3%). Other prominent components are Israeli citizenship (27.7%) and religious affiliation (24.5%), alongside Palestinian identity (13.5%).

The question of personal identity is dynamic, and responses to it are often influenced by the political and social circumstances prevailing at the time of the survey. A comparison of the current survey's findings to those of surveys carried out by the Konrad Adenauer Program during the past three years—before, during, and after the war—points to several trends: the consolidation of Arab identity as the dominant component; variation in the components of Israeli citizenship and religious affiliation under the influence of regional upheavals (the war in Gaza, the confrontation with Iran, and events in Syria); and the return of the Palestinian identity component to its level before the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023.

Significant differences on the question of identity were found among the three religious groups that make up Arab society. Arab identity is the most prominent component among Muslims, followed by religious affiliation, Israeli citizenship, and Palestinian identity. In contrast, the component of Israeli citizenship is dominant among Druze respondents and almost exceeds both religious affiliation and Arab identity. A hybrid picture emerges from the responses of Christian respondents: the most prominent components are Israeli citizenship and Arab identity, followed by Palestinian identity.


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An analysis of identity according to the voting intention of the respondents in the upcoming Knesset elections (2026) shows that the dominant component in the identity of supporters of Hadash-Ta'al and of Ra'am is Arab identity, while among supporters of Balad it is Palestinian identity. Among supporters of a Jewish party, the dominant component is Israeli citizenship, which is also more prominent among supporters of Ra'am than among supporters of Hadash-Ta'al and Balad. In contrast, the component of Palestinian identity is far more prominent among supporters of Balad and Hadash-Ta'al than among supporters of Ra'am.




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
What is the most important component of your personal identity?  
(May 2023 - May 2026, percent)



What is the most important component of your personal identity?  
(by religious affiliation, percent)



## Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation



The survey was initiated by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, in cooperation with the Israel Office of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

The survey was carried out by the Stat-Net Research Institute under the direction of Yousef Makladeh.

The data were collected during the period April 26 – May 3, 2026, in a telephone survey carried out in Arabic among a representative sample of the adult Arab population in Israel (aged 18+).

Size of the sample: 500. Sample error:  $\pm 4.4$  percent.