Unwanted Guest? The Social Media Campaign against Azmi Bishara in the Gulf

Author
Nachum Shiloh examines the campaign in Gulf social media against Azmi Bishara.
Date

 

Since former MK Dr. Azmi Bishara fled Israel in 2007 to avoid arrest for aiding Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War, he has been moving from one Arab capital to the next. During this time he has lectured on topics related to Israeli politics and the Israeli-Arab conflict, served as a commentator on Israeli affairs for several Arab television stations, and written columns in Arabic newspapers. For several years, Bishara has been living in Doha, the capital of Qatar, where he directs the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and serves as an advisor to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. There are those who think that Bishara, who is a Christian and now a Qatari citizen, is the most powerful person at Al-Jazeera.

While in Doha, Bishara has often been the subject of attacks from various parties in the Gulf, but the media campaign against him has moved up a level in recent weeks. Among his harshest critics is General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, a former commander of the Dubai police who was in the limelight following the assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. Known for his unbridled tongue, he was once demoted for making improper statements against various parties in both the UAE and the larger Arab world. Khalfan attacked Bishara in response to the latter establishing the satellite news channel Change (Al-Taghir) that broadcasts from London, with assistance and funding from Qatari authorities. “Bishara is a pet of the Israeli Mossad,” tweeted Khalfan, adding that Al-Taghir is nothing but a tool designed to foment civil war (fitna) in the Arab world, and damage the Gulf States and Egypt. Khalfan further tweeted that the younger generation of the Gulf States must act, and rise up against all the “servants of evil” in the Arabian Gulf, such as the “mercenary Azmi Bishara.” He urged the latter to leave the Gulf and “return to Palestine.”[1] At the climax of the campaign during December 2015, Khalfan tweeted dozens of statements against Bishara, and used the Twitter survey platform to inquire about attitudes towards him. More than 3,300 people participated in the survey, of whom nearly 80% expressed agreement with the statement that Bishara is “terrorist,” an “enemy of the Gulf” and an impediment to their security. 

The offensive Khalfan initiated against Bishara on social networking sites (SNS) is not surprising. Like other senior officials in the United Arab Emirates, Khalfan despises the rulers of Qatar and frequently denounces their positions, particularly their support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which is considered a destabilizing opposition force in most Arab countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The statements made by Khalfan apparently reflect the views of the UAE’s leaders, who prefer to use him as a transmitter for their messages in order to avoid direct confrontation with the leaders of Qatar. Even the media coverage of the Arab world on Al Jazeera comes under their criticism, as a result of the rulers of Qatar using the channel to goad Arab governments, especially those who have taken determined action against political Islamic movements in their countries, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

Further analysis of the discourse on SNS in the Gulf shows that strong criticism of Bishara is widespread, and even expressed by many in Qatar. In September 2015, Abdullah al-Mulla, an independent Qatari media personality, wrote on Twitter that the number of Qatari citizens tweeting attacks at Bishara was multiplying. Al-Mulla added that he “respects the rich experience and struggle of Bishara, but his re-invention plan [meaning Bishara’s plan to make the Arab states independent, democratic and free from dependence on the great powers] should be adapted to the Qatari character.” Al-Mulla’s words were retweeted by many users in Qatar, including Sheikh Suhaim bin Mohammed al-Thani, from the Qatari ruling family, who is a researcher at the Bishara’s research center in Doha.[2]

Digging into Qatari SNS reveals many opposition elements in the small emirate who want to harm Bishara. On September 4, 2015, an opposition supporter who calls himself “Hammad Al-Kuwari – a free Qatari” published an image of a burning car with the caption: “Shots fired at Azmi Bishara’s car in Doha, near Jawazat Bridge. The criminals fled in a Land-Cruiser” (pictured). Although Al-Kuwari referred to the perpetrators as “criminals,” and did not make any explicit statements attesting to his opposition stance, the fact that he shared the picture suggests that he is not among Bishara’s supporters.[3] This is, therefore, another example of “low key” opposition activity, for which SNS are the main – if not the only – platform where these ideas can be expressed.

A month before that event, on August 2, a Twitter account in the name of “The Qatari Free Army” (Al-Jaysh Al-Qatari Al-Hurr) appeared. Its “Message Number One” on the establishment of the organization, stated its goal as liberating Qatar from the clutches of the United States, and that its first act was the kidnapping of Azmi Bishara.[4] Bishara, of course, was not kidnapped and certainly not “freed through American mediation,” as the Qatari Free Army tweeted the next day. The Twitter account functioned for only a short time, and it is not clear whether such an organization was actually established, or whether someone opened the account for a brief time for propaganda purposes only. However, the selection of Bishara as the first target suggests that there are groups in Qatari society, even if they are marginal, who consider him a full partner in an illegitimate regime. It must be said that the focus of the Qatari opposition on Bishara is not only the result of their opposition to him per se, but also – and perhaps primarily – because these groups prefer, for their own reasons, not to confront the authorities directly. Bishara, as a Christian, pan-Arabist and effectively a visitor in Qatar, is a much easier target.

Discourse about Azmi Bishara crosses spatial boundaries in the cyberspace of the Persian Gulf. Months before Dhahi Khalfan launched his campaign against him, Bishara was already a topic of discussion in the Egyptian media. Newspapers sympathetic to the regime of President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, such as Al-Yawm Al-Sabi spared him no criticism or scorn. They claim that Bishara effectively controls Al-Jazeera, and played a key role in driving a wedge between the leaders of Qatar and the Egyptian army and security forces after the revolution of January 2011. Readers’ comments on these articles left no doubt; even some Egyptians consider Bishara someone who betrayed the Palestinian people and sold the struggle for money. For them, Bishara abandoned the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in favor of a life of ease; now he is nothing more than a puppet in the hands of the rulers of Qatar, meddling in the internal affairs of other Arab countries.[5]

In summary, the campaign against Azmi Bishara on SNS is not simply propaganda targeting a single individual; rather, it is multi-faceted. It firstly reflects the tensions between Qatar and the other Gulf states, and how none of the Gulf rulers want a direct media confrontation with the Qatari leaders at this time. Secondly, it demonstrates how frightened the Gulf states and Egypt are of the Muslim Brotherhood and the influence of Al-Jazeera. Finally, it opens a window on how the Qatari opposition functions, and shows that it lacks, at least for the time being, the ability and (probably) the willingness, to confront the rulers of Qatar directly.