War in the Caucasus: An Example of Pan-Nationalist/Religious Discourse on Turkish SNS

For several months, social networking sites (SNS) in Turkey became roiled following the terrorist attacks in Ankara and Istanbul, and the heavy losses that the Turkish army has suffered in battles being waged in the southeastern part of the country against militant groups. More recently, however, the armed conflict between Azerbaijan and the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (hereinafter, “NKR”) has dominated public discourse. In general, Turkish users take the side of Azerbaijan, out of a deep national and religious identification with the Azeri people. This position is also commonly supported by Turkish politicians, who see the debate as an opportunity to gain public support. Among the background issues are the long-standing conflict between Turkey and Armenia over the Armenian Genocide, and the Turks’ fear of a prospective massive Russian military presence in Armenia on its eastern border.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region, located in the Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is home to two main ethnic-religious groups: an Azeri-Muslim population and an Armenian-Christian population. In 1805, the region was conquered by the Russian Empire. After the Communist Revolution in 1917, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan was established in 1920. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which has an Armenian majority, then became an autonomous region under Azeri sovereignty.[1] With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh declared independence and the region became known as the “Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” This national entity never received international recognition, and is legally considered part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. On the surface, NKR functions as a separate entity independent of Armenia. Despite their close relationship, this is due to the fact that Armenia’s desires to avoid the appearance of having annexed the region. Since the early days of NKR, it has been the focal point for ethnic disputes between the Azeri and Armenian populations. In 1994, the sides reached agreement through Russian mediation on a cease-fire which would  maintain the status quo established when the Soviet Union was dissolved, and which would leave the territory in Armenian hands.[2] Occasional exchanges of fire continued in the region until November 2014 when there was a significant deterioration in the relationship between the Azeris and the Armenians following the shoot-down of an Armenian helicopter by the Azeris.[3] The tension peaked with a military confrontation between the two sides in early April 2015.

As has been demonstrated repeatedly, Turkish SNS are generally interested in events in the Muslim world, particularly those concerning peoples that are considered part of the Turkic family of nations. The Turkish public opinion is influenced, in most cases, by the national and religious identity of the parties. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Turkish public supports Azerbaijan in the present conflict. The ethos that considers Turkey and Azerbaijan two countries belonging to one ethnic nationality is firmly anchored in the Turkish consciousness and plays an important role in the Turks’ identification with the Azeris. This stance is based, inter alia, on the linguistic and cultural traits shared by the two peoples, which makes the relationship between the two countries organic. The position taken by the Turks is also influenced by the intractable tension between Turkey and Armenia surrounding their different interpretations of the events of 1915. While the Armenians consider those events a genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people, the Turks deny this claim, contending instead that the Turkish and Armenian peoples were both victims of the  First World War.

As part of the discourse on Turkish SNS, users created hashtags including “#Turkey is with you Azerbaijan” and “#End the occupation.”[4] Similarly, users shared a petition attempting to place the conflict on the agenda of the White House in Washington, in order to create diplomatic pressure on NKR and the Armenians who support it indirectly.[5] Barbs of criticism were also aimed at Turks who previously referred to themselves as “Armenians” as an act of identification after the 2007 assassination of Hrant Dink, who had been a senior Turkish journalist of Armenian descent.[6] A cartoon distributed on the internet called on them to help the Armenians fight the Azeris.[7]

The military conflict in the Caucasus is depicted on Turkish SNS as having the potential to expand into a comprehensive military campaign that might even be felt in Turkey. According to the prevailing opinion on SNS, the conflict is the result of direct pressure that Russia – considered the traditional patron of the Armenians – has brought to bear on NKR Armenians, encouraging them to attack the Azeris. Proponents of this interpretation claim that the Russians are motivated by a desire to force the Armenians, who support NKR economically and militarily, to demand additional aid from Russia, including personnel. They believe that Turkey could therefore eventually find itself facing an expanded Russian presence on Armenian territory just over its eastern border. If that comes to pass, Turkey would be completely surrounded by Russian forces, which are currently located on its southern border in Syria, in the Black Sea to the north, and on the west in the Aegean Sea, where the Russian Navy opened fire on Turkish fishermen last December.[8] This claim expresses the exacerbated suspicion and tension towards Russia felt by Turks since the Russian aircraft was downed following a violation of Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015.

Turkish politicians, led by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the spokesperson for the Justice and Development (AKP) Party Ömer Çelik, did not remain indifferent to the public discourse. They made official statements of Turkey’s support for “the Beloved Azerbaijan (Can Azerbaycan).[9] In disputes of this type, it is evident that these politicians wish to position Turkey as a patron of Muslims, particularly Turkic peoples, and as an emerging power in the Islamic world, in order to improve the government’s image in the eyes of the Turkish public. This political tactic has proven effective, and the Turkish public historically has expressed greater satisfaction with the government’s performance following events of this type.[10]

The dispute between Azerbaijan and NRK demonstrates that the Turkish public chooses to stand by peoples that it feels an affinity for, and that the pan-Turkish national identity and the pan-Islamic religious identity respectively both play significant roles. For its part, the Turkish government is well aware of this and uses it for its political benefit. Previous experience shows that public support of the government often increases following any sharp criticism of Israel, China, Russia or Armenia.  This is largely due to the fact that such positions are considered to be a demonstration of Turkey’s power in face of influential countries, and is a conspicuous component of a Turkish foreign policy which has been largely designed to serve domestic policy.