Morocco and the Israel-Gaza War: Riding Out the Storm

The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli-Hamas war in Gaza has affected Moroccan public life, and continues to generate political developments in the North African kingdom. Although geographically distant from the conflict, the war is closely followed by many Moroccans. Popular solidarity with the Palestinian cause remains high, while the Moroccan government and King Mohamed VI have so far opted to try and ride out the current storm, and not risk endangering achievements Morocco has gained over the past three years after renewing diplomatic relations with Israel. This paper discusses Moroccan reactions to the Hamas-Israel war, Moroccan views on the war’s potential outcome, and its implications for future relations with Israel and other parties.

October 7, 2023 found Morocco in a desirable regional and international diplomatic position. In recent years, Morocco’s position as a stable and reliable ally to Western countries in a challenging region has been further strengthened. It has also expanded its involvement on the African continent, and was invited to rejoin the African Union in 2017. These developments advanced Morocco’s claims regarding the Western Sahara region. Securing international endorsement of its sovereignty over the contested region remains Morocco’s primary foreign policy goal. The Kingdom seeks to secure a Moroccan victory in a conflict that has been lingering on for nearly 50 years, extending control over the region and removing the possibility of any alternative. This has generated regional tension, primarily between Morocco and Algeria, which endorses the notion of an independent Sahara state.

The Western Sahara issue is linked to Morocco’s wider involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. In December 2020, the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the region, delivering a major diplomatic breakthrough to Rabat. As part of that recognition, Morocco agreed to renew diplomatic relations with Israel, which were severed in 2000 following the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada. For Morocco, the benefit of American recognition of its position in the Western Sahara outweighed any reservations it may have had about cultivating ties with the Jewish state. While no other country has followed the American recognition (apart from Israel, in August 2023), the pendulum in the Western Sahara question is increasingly swinging in Morocco’s favor. Few in the international community today endorse the idea of securing the region’s independence, and most lean towards the Moroccan proposal of autonomy rule under Moroccan sovereignty as the solution to the lingering crisis.

Moreover, by linking relations to Israel with the Western Sahara question, the Moroccan monarchy (which effectively manages the Kingdom’s foreign policies) neutralized domestic opposition to the move. Nevertheless, there has been an undercurrent of opposition to relations with Israel, periodically expressing itself in demonstrations and petitions demanding their end. These calls so far have had no effect. Indeed, Morocco’s relations with Israel have flourished over the past two and a half years, as Morocco moved "full speed ahead" in expanding ties. These efforts included official visits of Israeli ministers (including then Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid in August, 2021; then Defense Minister Benny Gantz in November, 2021 and Transportation Minister Miri Regev in May, 2022). In July, 2023, King Mohamed VI extended an invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to visit the kingdom, thanking him for Israel’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty in the Western Sahara; This proposed visit did not materialize after the war’s outbreak. Israeli tourism to the kingdom was also encouraged, as Morocco allowed direct flights to and from Israel.

The scope and pace of these developments exceeded all expectations, suggesting that Morocco had no reservations concerning its relations with Israel. Military cooperation with Israel has become particularly important to Morocco, as it gained greater military advantages that would be difficult to abandon. In January 2023 the Moroccan armed forces announced expanded military cooperation with Israel, including in logistics, electronic warfare acquisition, and modernization of air defense equipment. Later in the year it was announced that Elbit, an Israeli company, would open new sites in Morocco for arms manufacturing. Morocco also reportedly began in 2022 building Israeli military drones under Israeli supervision, and purchased a 500 million dollar Israeli-made modular air defense missile system.

This was the backdrop to Morocco’s reaction to the Israel-Hamas war. Israeli tourists hastily departed Morocco after the October 7 attack, and flights between the two countries were and remain suspended (on the Moroccan side because of fear of the war, and on the Israeli end due to concern about attacks on visiting Israelis). Business meetings have been relocated to other countries. Israel closed its diplomatic mission in Rabat out of security concerns. Morocco, for its part, has not followed suit, and refrained from formally closing its diplomatic mission in Israel, keeping its diplomats in place. Together with other countries, Morocco vetoed a proposal to cut ties with Israel at the special Arab-Islamist summit in Riyadh in November 2023.

Public opinion in the Kingdom has largely rallied behind the Palestinian cause, with regular protests taking place in Moroccan cities, demanding an end to Israel’s military actions in Gaza. Tens of thousands of Moroccans participated in these demonstrations, in solidarity with the Palestinians. These protests have been organized by influential Islamist and leftist party leaders, with the authorities’ consent. They have been peaceful, and refrain from targeting Morocco’s small Jewish community. The government views the protests as an expression of civil rights, and has not objected to the public demands for de-escalation of the Gaza conflict, humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians.

In addition to the protests, there have been calls to boycott French and American companies that are active in the Moroccan market and also operate in Israel. These include the French Carrefour supermarket chain, McDonald’s, and Starbucks. Earlier protests against Carrefour prior to the war were dispersed by the police. These calls have not generated much public action, but have caused some apprehension among these retailers. McDonald’s Morocco denied supporting or financing any governmental affiliations.

It is difficult to assess to what extent these protests reflect the entire Moroccan society. Beyond the political movements and elites demanding a more robust Moroccan response to the war in Gaza, the silent majority of Moroccans, without internet access or deep involvement in public life, seem to be less involved and does not have strong opinions about the war, according to Sarah Zaaimi of the Atlantic Council. Some Moroccans balked when Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal called on Moroccans in November to "address" their leaders and request the termination of relations with Israel. They viewed this as an intervention in domestic affairs, and a lack of sensitivity to the complex diplomatic landscape in which Morocco operates, even as the Kingdom’s rallying behind the Palestinians cause is clear.

Moroccan authorities appear not to be very concerned about domestic opposition to relations with Israel and demands for a more robust reaction to the war. On January 10, the Moroccan government refused to receive a petition signed by 10,200 people, demanding an end to normalization with Israel. A government spokesperson claimed that the refusal was due to procedural reasons, without referring to the petition’s topic. The government continues to refrain from getting involved with the anti-normalization movement, even as these activists promise to intensify their campaign. Officials seem confident in their ability to steer the course.

While Morocco has called for a cease fire between Israel and Hamas, official statements related to the crisis have been sparse. More than anything, Morocco has been trying for the past three months to "ride out the storm" and limit its involvement in the crisis. Morocco traditionally prefers to embrace quiet, behind the scenes diplomacy, and its cautious stance in this case is not unusual.

Moroccan foreign policy under King Mohamed VI has witnessed an overall retreat from Middle Eastern affairs. While his late father, Hassan II, was involved in regional diplomacy, the current King is less interested in being in the spotlight. He is largely absent from regional summits, and maintains a low profile compared to other leaders. Much of Morocco’s diplomatic energy is currently channeled towards expanding its imprint on the African continent, and less on the Middle East. Other issues at the top of the Kingdom’s diplomatic agenda are its relations with Europe, and the recently announced FIFA decision that Morocco would be one of the countries to host the football World Cup in 2030. Preparations for that event, and a declining involvement in Middle East politics (without compromising its general positions concerning the region) suggest that Morocco’s attention will be on other diplomatic arenas. Morocco could potentially play a role and post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, capitalizing on its good relations with both Israelis and Palestinians.9 The extent of this, however, is questionable. Its actions, if at all, may be limited to behind the scenes mediating efforts, rather than high profile projects. For now, Morocco’s aspirations concerning the war are riding out the storm.