The Palestinian Authority and the West Bank in the "Iron Swords" Operation

The war that erupted on October 7 is the gravest episode in the hundred-plus year history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Never had so many Israelis been killed in one day (including in Israel’s wars with its neighbors). And never have such a high number of Palestinians been killed in a confrontation with Israel, including in the 1948 Nakba. This difficult conflict has serious regional and international implications and is expected to reshape the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, including the prevailing perceptions regarding any potential settlement between the two societies.

The war is also a reflection of profound changes in the Palestinian system. First, it illustrates the dominant position that Hamas has established in shaping the strategic agenda of the Palestinian collective, in contrast to the deep stagnation of the Palestinian Authority, and of the idea of a political settlement with Israel more generally. This is an expression of a deeper trend in the Palestinian system. The Islamic leadership has strengthened its position, while the national leadership of the PLO and Fatah, which led the Palestinians for many decades, has weakened. Moreover, the war represents an unprecedented nadir in the Palestinian system: there is no clear political vision, except for a continuation of the all-out war against Israel; there is no unified leadership; and there is no dialogue between the public and decision-makers.

Hamas’s surprise attack occurred at a time when the Palestinian Authority was mired in a deep internal crisis that raises serious questions about its future. Thirty years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, it seems as if the two-state vision is shattered: the deadlock in the political negotiations has deepened; Israel has constantly changed the demographic, geographic, and economic conditions in the West Bank, bringing the two sides closer to a one-state reality; the world, including the Arab world, demonstrated a growing weariness with the Palestinians; and in Israel, the widespread assumption took root that normalization with the Arab world was possible without resolving the Palestinian issue.

The influence of the war in Gaza on the West Bank reflects a combination of anger, in view of Israel’s unprecedented damage to the Palestinian collective, together with a sense of satisfaction and elation at the damage inflicted on Israel. At the same time there is also anxiety from the possibility that the campaign in Gaza could spill into the West Bank and inflict carnage and destruction on a similar scale. This state of mind is reflected in the media with the widespread use of the phrase, "the threat of the second Nakba." The same complex approach finds expression in the public discourse in the West Bank. On the one hand, the public shows strong support for the Hamas attack, even stronger than their compatriots in Gaza.

In a survey published in mid-December 2023 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Public Opinion Research (PCPSR), and headed by Khalil Shikaki, it found that 82 percent of residents of the West Bank support the October 7 attack by Hamas (compared to 57 percent in the Gaza Strip); only 5 percent of West Bank residents believe that Hamas committed war crimes that day (compared to 17 percent in the Gaza Strip); while 75 percent thought that it was suitable for Hamas to rule in Gaza after the war (compared with 38 percent of Gaza residents); and 68 percent support armed struggle as the primary means of confronting Israel (compared with 56 percent in Gaza and 33 percent in the West Bank in September 2023).

On the other hand, more than four months after the start of the war, the West Bank has not developed into another front, as Hamas had hoped. There is indeed an increase in the scope of terrorism, but the public has largely avoided joining the cycle of violence and launching a third intifada. This is likely deeply frustrating for Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, added to Hizballah’s limited response, and the decision of the Arab public in Israel to refrain from inter-communal violence like that during Operation "Guardian of the Walls" in May 2021.

A large part of the public’s growing anger in the West Bank is directed at the Palestinian Authority, which is perceived by many Palestinians, even before the war, as a weak institution that is compromised by its collaboration with Israel. This is reflected in the previously mentioned PCPSR public opinion poll, which shows that approximately 90 percent of the Palestinian public would like to see Mahmoud Abbas ("Abu Mazen") resign, and the majority of the respondents in the West Bank today say they would vote for Hamas in future elections. Against this background, demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority and in support of Hamas have taken place at several different locations across the West Bank. However, to date these events have not erupted into mass protests in the spirit of the 2010-2011 "Arab Spring" uprisings, with the power to threaten the stability of the government in Ramallah.

Indeed, the Palestinian Authority is in a particularly awkward position. On the one hand, it levels harsh criticism at Israel for the war in Gaza, and claims to represent all Palestinians (in both the West Bank and Gaza), while at the same time avoiding any condemnation of Hamas’s October 7 massacres. On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority continues to maintain its close coordination with Israel, particularly in the security sector, discouraging any violence that would lead to its losing control of the street. All of this has taken place as Israel has dramatically increased its military operations in the West Bank since the start of the war in Gaza. Israel has conducted large-scale operations in the West Bank’s refugee camps, especially in Jenin, Balata in Nablas, and Nur Shams in Tulkarm.

The growing military friction illustrates both Israel’s determination to quell any threat that develops in the West Bank, while exercising power that has not been seen in recent years (for example, the systematic operation of unmanned aerial vehicles against terrorist targets in some Palestinian cities), and the profound weakness of the Palestinian Authority. This is particularly true in the northern region of the West Bank, where the PA has not been able to enforce security for several years. This has allowed various terrorist groups to expand and launch operations against Israeli settlers, and even target Israeli settlements that are located beyond the Green Line.

In addition to the PA’s diminished authority in portions of the West Bank, a serious economic crisis has erupted since Israel imposed severe restrictions on the number of Palestinian laborers who are permitted to work in Israel after October 7. The number of workers was reduced from 175,000 (25,000 who worked in Israeli settlements in the West Bank) to a few thousand, resulting in unemployment’s doubling from 15 to 30 percent.

This has also become a controversial issue in the Israeli political discourse. There is broad support among decision-makers for allowing a relatively large number of the workers to return for the purpose of supporting certain ailing sectors of the Israeli economy (like construction) and preventing a further erosion of stability in the West Bank. However, some senior Israeli officials, mainly from the religious Zionism (but also several from the Likud), oppose the return of Palestinian laborers on the grounds that it could lead to another October 7 event. There are even some who call for the complete economic separation between Israel and the West Bank and argue that Israel should bring in more workers from abroad.

Against the background of the deteriorating economic and security situation in the West Bank, Abu Mazen is confronted with the question of "the day after" in Gaza. For the time being, there appears to be a gap between the American expectation that the Palestinian Authority would demonstrate a strong interest in assuming responsibility for Gaza, and what looks like limited ambition of the administration in Ramallah to do so. Indeed, the expectation that the Palestinian Authority, which barely controls the West Bank, will be able to control an additional 2.2 million Palestinians in an area that has suffered unprecedented destruction, is unrealistic. Moreover, Gazans have been educated to view Abu Mazen as a collaborator who has imposed sanctions on them and contributed to their misery and suffering.

The PA is also frustrated by American demands that it implement far-reaching reforms that address government corruption. At the same time, Israel has publicly declared it will not allow the PA, as it is currently configured, to return to Gaza. It has made it clear that first and foremost the PA must curtail the incitement against Israel that is prevalent in the media, in religious institutions, and in the educational system. The PA is reluctant to return to Gaza to begin with, and it has made it clear that it won’t let others dictate the terms of its return to the Strip, particularly given the appearance of returning on the tips of Israeli bayonets.

It is still unclear if and when Israel will succeed in bringing down Hamas. Abu Mazen is therefore taking a cautious approach to discussions about the day after. He demands to be involved in any discussion of the post-Hamas future, and is working to build an Arab bloc of support for his position. And yet he remains vague about what inducements it would take for the PA to accept responsibility for Gaza, which would include deploying security forces there and re-establishing an administration capable of governing the Strip.

The current war reflected the deep need for political and cultural changes to the Palestinian system. Beyond the administrative changes required, such as reducing corruption and addressing the alienation between the public and the leadership, the Palestinian system requires a deep change in consciousness, particularly with regard to attitudes towards Israel. After dealing a historic blow to Israel, but at the same time suffering unprecedented harm, the Palestinians must ask themselves difficult questions, which they have avoided for many years, chief among them is whether it is better to focus on the development of "the here and now" or to continue to pursue uncompromising maximalist goals that lead time and time again to suffering. The latter approach has produced a bipolar pattern that fluctuates between aggression on the one hand and victimization on the other.