New Syria in the Making – Challenges and Opportunities for Israel

Abstract:

The Hay’at Tahri al-Sham (HTS) surprise attack that began on November 27th and took Damascus in less than two weeks, caught many by surprise, including President Bashar al Assad, who fled the city on December 7th. Ahmed ah-Sharaa, aka Mohammad al-Joulani, the leader of HTS, has expressed pragmatism thus far as he seeks to build a “new Syria”; an inclusive Syrian National Project that aims to guarantee the rights of Syria’s diverse ethnic and ideological groups. While this new vision is in sync with the moderate regional partners, the challenge is enormous. Success requires a power-sharing model to win the support of most Syrians. While not everyone is willing to share power, and many question the leadership of a former Jihadi backed by Islamists, now is the time to engage with those working to forge a new and different future for Syria.

The Turkish interest in Damascus, and the region at large, goes back centuries. In the 16th century, Sultan Selim used his relatively short reign to significantly expand the territory of the Ottoman Empire. In 1516, Sultan Selim I conquered Syria at the end of a swift campaign. Selim I then threw his forces southward in the Ottoman–Mamluk War, and defeated the Mamluks in Syria. Syria would remain in Ottoman possession for four hundred years. He entered Damascus in October 1517 and continued to Egypt. Although white Toyota pickups were unavailable at the time, his swift victory was achieved partially thanks to his artillery. Selim I conquered the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, expanding the empire from Syria and Palestine to Hejaz and Tihamah in the Arabian Peninsula. Five hundred years later, and about a century following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it appears that Damascus may again be in the hands of the (Neo)-Ottomans, or at least what seems to be a Neo-Ottoman proxy. Turkey has already promised to build five military bases in Syria and assist in the development of the new Syrian army. Is this the beginning of a new Pax-Ottomana in the Middle East? Or might this be another short chapter in the bloody Syrian conflict? More importantly, what are the ramifications of these new dynamics to Syria and Israel, as well as the regional agenda?

The HTS surprise attack that began on November 27th and that had taken Damascus in less than two weeks caught many by surprise, including President Bashar al Assad, who fled the city on December 7th. Syria, still fractured and struggling to recover from the “Syrian Spring” that devolved into a civil, proxy, and interregional war, now has a new ruler seated at Mt. Mezze Palace in Damascus. Nevertheless, the old problems still remain.

Ahmed ah-Sharaa, aka Mohammad al-Joulani, has taken a pragmatic approach thus far. He has commented on the vision of the new Syrian project: “The Syrian population has lived together for thousands of years.”  Moreover, “we will have dialogue and ensure everyone is represented.” The old regime always played with sectarian divisions, he added, “but we will not... I think the revolution can contain everybody.” These ideas are pivotal for the success of a possible Syrian National Project that Mr. ah-Sharaa seeks to create. However, they also hint at the challenge that lies ahead of bringing a divided country, still not recovered from a sectarian war, together.

Between Old Syrian Divisions and a New Syrian Project

Syria is home to a mosaic of ethnic groups, with most of the population being Arab and Sunni. These groups comprised over 70% of the country’s pre-war population. In addition to Arabs, Syria has significant Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian populations. The Kurds, primarily in the northeastern regions, have distinct languages and cultures and have used the vacuum created by war to further establish their autonomy in northeastern Syria, where a de-facto Kurdish enclave was created. The Armenian community, many of whom are descendants of survivors of the Armenian Genocide, is concentrated in several urban centers. Assyrians, an ancient ethnic group, also have a presence, particularly in the northeast. Other minorities, such as Alawites, Druze, and Turkmen, further add to the country’s ethnic complexity. Under the Assad regime, the Alawites, comprising roughly 12% of the pre-war population, aligned with other minority groups, recognizing the need for allies to maintain control over the Arab Sunni majority. Twelve years of war have changed the demographic composition of Syria. The majority of those killed – over 600,000 according to most estimates and close to a million according to some – in the rebellion were Sunni Arabs. The same applies to the number of refugees who left Syria, which is estimated to be between 6-7 million out of the 23 million pre-war population.

Unfortunately, Syria’s divisions do not end with ethnic or religious tensions. The conflict, an all-out, civil, ethnic, and proxy war that has tarnished Syria since 2012, created additional divisions that manifested in new armed groups with local, regional, or ideological agendas. At the peak of the war, estimates counted more than 1,000 local armed groups throughout the country with over 100,000 armed rebels (separate from the 200,000 soldiers of the pre-war Syrian military). While most ethnic groups, specifically the Kurds, the Druze, and the Alawites (who until recently controlled the Syrian military) have significant fighting forces, other forces exist on the ground as well. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Turkey-backed Islamic group that has taken Damascus and formed a new government, was formed in 2017. The group is a merger between several armed factions such as Jaysh al-Ahrar, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and others. This is not a unitary military force, and its commander, Ahmed ah-Sharaa, will need to work hard to make sure that he has control not only of his own men, but also of the hundreds of other local militias who still hold weapons in Syria.