"The current crisis does not threaten the formal diplomatic relations between Israel, on the one hand, and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, on the other (nor does it threaten formal bilateral relations with the other Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco). However, there are serious question marks about the scope and content of these relations in the post-war era. In Israel, the Abraham Accords were greeted with great enthusiasm, largely because of the (over-optimistic) assumption that they would be qualitatively different from the “cold peace” treaties that exist with the “senior” peace partners, Egypt, and Jordan. They would, it was anticipated, not only be formal, but encompass the business sectors and the public in a much greater manner than the older agreements.
However, decline in public support for the Abraham Accords in the relevant countries was already discernible before the most recent conflagration. The re-assertion of the Palestinian issue in the center of the regional and international agenda has hardened the anti-Israeli trends in the public, even if it is not given political expression and does not pose overt limitations on government policy. This will have an impact on future economic relations, on Israel’s integration into upcoming long-term regional infrastructure and connectivity projects—which could “bake in” limitations to Israel’s place in the region in the future—and on the prospects for “people-to-people” relations. The expansion of the circle of normalization, which on the eve of October 7 seemed quite plausible, may well have been deferred indefinitely."
*The opinions expressed in MDC publications are the authors’ alone.