Turkey’s Long Month: Agreements to Normalize Relations, Terror, and a Failed Coup

On the night of Friday, July 15, Turkey was shocked by an attempt by 8651 soldiers from the ranks of the Turkish army whose goal was ousting President Erdoğan from government.[1] During the attempted coup, 240 people were killed. The absence on social networking sites (SNS) of supporters for the coup was conspicuous, considering the impressive presence of the government’s supporters, and other opponents of the coup, who played a significant role in its defeat. During the coup, discourse on Turkish SNS was marked by a sense of unity; Turks from disparate political backgrounds joined together to protect the country. But once the coup was halted, the deep divisions between the different camps in Turkish society reappeared. Recent events prior to the coup, which included normalization of relations with Israel and Russia, as well as the attack at Atatürk Airport, were portrayed as factors influencing the failed coup.

The dramatic coup attempt was preceded by a stormy period that battered Turkey; it began with the publication of the agreements for normalizing relations with Israel and Russia on June 27, and continuing with the terrorist attack carried out by ISIS at Atatürk Airport, which killed 45 people the following day.[2] Unlike their previous stance, supporters of the government now expressed support for the new conciliatory politics, because they believed that normalization of relations with Israel will facilitate sending humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and that reconciliation with Moscow might benefit the Turkish tourism industry.[3] In contrast, many secular people called Erdoğan a “servant of Israel,” and claimed that the agreement with Israel did not yield significant benefit.[4] Among the Islamists, including supporters of IHH (the organization responsible for the Gaza flotilla), there were also those who were sharply critical of the Turkish president for the reconciliation efforts.[5] In response, Erdoğan scolded the flotilla organizers, claiming that they did not have his blessing for dispatching the flotilla to Gaza in the first place, saying: “Did you ask me?” This, incidentally, briefly became a slogan used to ridicule the president for his alleged abandonment of the Palestinian struggle.

While discourse on SNS was focusing on these foreign policy developments, ISIS attacked the airport. Turkish users tweeted that Turkey would not give in to terrorism and that they “refuse to become accustomed to” living under a constant threat of terrorism.[6] At the same time, the hashtag “#we're not secure,” began to spread on SNS, which expressed the sense of fear that users feel, given the country’s precarious security situation.[7]Users also expressed harsh criticism of Turkey’s foreign policy in Syria that, they believed, caused terrorism to spill over the border and into Turkey.

Turkey’s isolation from Israel, Egypt and Syria in the Middle East, its shaky relations with Russia, and attacks by ISIS and the PKK created a state of instability. In retrospect, it seems that this should have been a golden opportunity for coup perpetrators to take over power in the country. On the other hand, the ousting of former Prime Minister Davutoğlu, who was portrayed as the source of the problems in Turkey’s foreign policy, worked in Erdoğan’s favor, as did the actions he took to repair the country’s foreign relations, as part of a new foreign policy characterized by a spirit of appeasement. In fact, these measures worked to the detriment of the conspirators because they ended Turkey’s isolation in the international arena, significantly strengthened the legitimacy of the Erdoğan government, and reduced economic and political pressures both at home and abroad. It seems that the coup perpetrators chose to implement the planned coup before the positive impact of these steps could be felt in Turkish society.

The coup attempt began with blocking Istanbul’s Bosphorus Bridge that connects the Asian and European sections of the city, and is its main lifeline. This was followed by aerial sorties by elements of the Turkish Air Force over the skies of Istanbul and the capital Ankara, and the capture of the Turkish chief-of-staff. At the same time, a helicopter hovering over the area opened fire on the Turkish Intelligence Organization (MIT) headquarters, and there was an attempted raid that led the conspirators to the hotel in Marmaris where President Erdoğan was staying, in order to assassinate or capture him. Because the number of perpetrators was small, comprising approximately one-and-a-half percent of the Turkish army, and because they were unable to win the support of senior officers, the coup failed to gain sufficient power. Moreover, during the coup rebel forces coordinated their moves on the social network WhatsApp, and failed to take over the major news channels and SNS. This allowed the government to use such media to mobilize the public against the coup. In a television interview with CNN TURK, using the Face Time application, Erdoğan called on the public to take to the streets. The crowds who took part in curbing the perpetrators included opponents of the president who sought to prevent the damage to democracy that would result from his ouster. Citizens physically blocked the tanks’ path, and called on others to join using the hashtag “No coup in Turkey.”[8] Similar calls were also made from minarets around Turkey, accompanied by cries of “Allahu Akbar,” which explicitly expressed the clergy’s support for Erdoğan. Resistance to the coup become a matter of the public interest, common to all parties in the parliament.

A range of factors, including mass support in the streets, insufficient backing in the military and the determination of the police, put an end to the coup. In most cases, it was policemen who arrested soldiers. However, there were multiple cases in which the crowd lynched conspiring soldiers. Many users protested against these phenomena and launched a social campaign called, “Do not touch my soldier.”[9] Users stressed that low-ranking soldiers were just following orders, and had no right to object to their superiors. Another argument used was that the soldiers did not know they were taking part in a coup, but rather had been told that it was merely a military drill.

After the coup attempt, some users – particularly secular ones – doubted the authenticity of the process, and the hashtag “this isn’t a coup, it’s theater” became popular on SNS. From their perspective, Erdoğan and his party staged the coup to oust their opponents from all power centers in Turkey, and to enable the transformation of Turkey into a centralized presidential republic. Users mocked the “amateurishness” demonstrated by conspirators during the coup, and their inability to take over the centers of power. Conversely, supporters of Erdoğan suggested that those who doubt the veracity of the coup need a “brain transplant.” Such discourse ended the sense of unity that characterized events during the coup. The tension grew when supporters of the government compared the coup to the riots in Gezi Park in 2013. Those riots had aimed to prevent Erdoğan from turning the park into a shopping center to be constructed in the shape of the Ottoman Gunner House, on whose ruins the park was built. Users spread the hashtag “not for the trees; for the homeland,” which was intended to present the current struggle as a patriotic fight for the homeland, unlike the events in Gezi Park.[10] In a speech on July 19, the day after the issue was raised on SNS, Erdoğan presented a plan to realize his intentions for Gezi Park.[11] After being exposed to the discussion on SNS, Erdoğan apparently came to the conclusion that the post-coup reality and the state of emergency he had declared gave him a golden opportunity to implement his plans for the Gezi Compound.

Another controversy that shook SNS related to the prospective punishment for conspirators. Government supporters sought to impose severe penalties on conspiring soldiers, including potentially renewing the death penalty.[12] Supporters of the idea included many nationalists who demanded that it also be applied to the leader of the Kurdish (PKK) Abdullah Öcalan – contrary to the current position of the government– and also to sex criminals. On the other hand, as expected, secular users opposed the death penalty on the grounds that it is a fundamental violation of human rights, [13] and appealed for mercy for the tearful mothers of the coup perpetrators.

Beyond any doubt, SNS in Turkey proved their power in shaping events on the ground. Ironically, they were used to save the Erdoğan regime from the coup. This event provides the first proof of what was previously a theoretical predication that the advent of SNS would challenge the traditional pattern of military coups that begin with the takeover of mainstream media.[14] The anti-military discourse of all camps during the coup attempt shows that the Turkish people do not consider a military regime preferable to the rule of President Erdoğan. The conspirators’ hopes that senior officers and civilian opponents of the government would join a coup that began in the field did not materialize. In fact, the conspirators met with widespread public opposition. This does, however, disguise the deep divisions that exist in Turkish society.