"Saudi Vision 2030": One vision, many views

Author
Nachum Shiloh analyzes the reactions on Saudi social media to the "Saudi Vision 2030" initiative.
Date


On April 25, 2016, the heir to the Saudi Crown, Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz, announced an ambitious project entitled, “Saudi Vision 2030” (Ra'it Al-Saudi Arabia 2030), which includes measures to change the socio-economic structure of the kingdom. Its implementation may result in abolishing the extensive subsidy policy that began after Prince Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz ascended the throne in 1964. Under this policy, the Saudi government used the massive oil royalties flowing to the kingdom as a means of providing for all of the population’s needs with regards to education, health, welfare and religious services. Publication of this initiative was followed by extensive dialogue on social networking sites (SNS) in Saudi Arabia.[1] Unlike the establishment media, which made an effort to present public opinion in the kingdom as being unanimous in its support, diverse opinions emerged from the discourse on SNS. The regime, which is aware of the power of SNS in shaping national discourse, is trying to moderate criticism of the project by creating transparency and making information on the subject accessible to the public, in order to enlist their support.

The Saudi Vision 2030 initiative is part of a plan that has already been the subject of discussion between the Saudi authorities and society. However, it has now been developed into a comprehensive initiative, in light of falling oil prices and emerging economic and geo-strategic challenges facing Saudi Arabia and the region. The program deals extensively with the relationship between state and society in the kingdom, and includes measures for freeing Saudi Arabia from its oil dependence by developing alternative economic activities. These include tourism and industry, as well as extensive privatization, increasing competitiveness and providing equal opportunities. For example, one of the aims stated plan is to significantly expand the proportion of women in the Saudi labor force.[2] As a result of these measures, the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes in the kingdom is expected to grow, while the monopoly enjoyed by the royal family and the elite surrounding it becomes reduced. If so, it would be a significant revolution for Saudi society.

Saudi SNS convey the public’s ambivalent positions with regards to the enterprise. Along with much praise for the project and its patron, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, there are more than a few comments, mostly by young people, expressing concern and doubts about several of its components. These include concern that implementing the plan will transform Saudi Arabia into a country with a market economy that guarantees economic security only for those who are successful investors. For example, one young user tweeted: “The only change will be that Saudi Arabia becomes a country devoid of justice and responsibility, a country where there is no justice in the distribution of resources.”[3] Some users argued that the project is not likely to improve status of women in the kingdom. A young Saudi student tweeted: “A state unable to decide that women may drive [now] publishes an economic vision. If it failed to do something simple, how will it be able to deal with the economy?”[4]

Of particular interest is the reaction of Saudi clerics. Saudi Vision 2030 has inherent potential to substantially erode their position in favor of economic elites, and lead to initiatives that are contrary to the position of religious leaders, such as increasing women’s share in the national GDP. However, the religious establishment, including some members of the Supreme Council of Clerics and even semi-establishment religious scholars like Sheikh Salman al-Auda (who once opposed the regime) and Sheikh Aaidh al-Qarni (who is known for preaching repentance to al-Qaeda operatives in the kingdom), expressed enthusiastic support for the program.[5] There are, however, exceptions. Sheikh Mohammed al-‘Arifi, who is now considered the top religious authority in Saudi Arabia in particular and in the Sunni world more generally, placed his faith in Allah, rather than in Prince Mohammed bin Salman to direct the project in the right way, which might indicate a modicum of criticism: “Allah, make Saudi Vision 2030 into a vision that brings honor and respect to the kingdom and is a source of blessing to our people everywhere. Protect us, unify us and be our support.”[6] Needless to say, considering the delicate relationship between establishment and semi-establishment religious leaders and the authorities, overt criticism is out of the question because the clerics are still dependent, to some extent, on the regime.

On the other side, the Saudi authorities are currently making substantial use of SNS to mobilize public support for the plan. As part of an establishment-led media campaign, accounts named “Saudi Vision 2030” were opened on all leading SNS, especially Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram.[7] They are used to present the message that the project is expected to contribute to the well-being and empowerment of Saudi society. Most posts include visual elements – charts, graphs and tables – designed to make the message more accessible to the public. There are also many posts in English, indicating the authorities’ desire to appeal to Western ears, and present the Saudi vision of economic and military independence for the kingdom.

It is interesting to note that the extensive use of SNS by the royal family allows us, inter alia, to detect subtleties in the relationships between family members, including the tension prevailing within the upper echelons of the Saudi leadership. The royal family generally expresses broad support for Saudi Vision 2030 and other initiatives by Prince Mohammed bin Salman. But careful observation of tweets posted by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef – the heir apparent who may someday be asked to step aside in favor of the next in line, namely Prince Mohammed bin Salman – reveals tension between him and the latter. For example, immediately after the launch of the project, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef tweeted statements that presented Prince Mohammed bin Salman as his assistant and subordinate: “I bless the homeland and the source of my help, my brother and my right hand, Muhammad bin Salman on this ambitious vision. May Allah protect our king and our country.”

The public discourse on SNS regarding Saudi Vision 2030 opens a window for understanding the mood within Saudi society. Unlike traditional media, SNS show that while Saudi Vision 2030 was well-received by some of the public and leadership, other parts of the public actually perceive it as a source for concern. Regardless of the decision made regarding the project, SNS will provide an opportunity to gain insight into the mood within the kingdom and the sources of power active there, in contrast to previous eras, in which the regime controlled the media completely. This is, therefore, also an expression of progress made by the Saudi regime that recognizes the power of discourse on SNS and is working to recruit public support in that arena.


[1] رؤية_السعودية_2030# #saudivision2030, and see statistics at BBC.com.   

[2] “Full text of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030,” Alarabiya, 26 April 2016.

[3] @quarty93, Twitter.com.  

[4] @life1992m, Twitter.com.  

[6] @mohamadalarefe, Twitter.com.  

[7] @Saudivision2030, Twitter.com,  viewed on May 5, 2016; @Saudi2030, Facebook.com